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WHEN BANK EXAMINERS GET IT WRONG:
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION APPEALS OF
MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONSt
JULIE ANDERSEN HILL*
ABSTRACT
Banks and credit unions sometimes complain that the examination
process regulators use to police banking practices is oppressive. These
financial institutions complain that regulators reach unduly negative
"material
supervisory
as
known
conclusions
examination

determinations." Institutions are wary because negative determinations
can subject an institution to further regulatory scrutiny or enforcement

actions.
To guard against erroneous determinations, Congress, in 1994,
enacted a statute requiring federal financial institution regulators to

provide an appeals process. Each of the four regulators (the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and the National Credit Union Administration)
adopteda unique materialsupervisory determinationappealsprocess.
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Using data (some collected through Freedom of Information Act
requests) about material supervisory decision appeals since 1994 and
interviews with top regulators, this Article provides the first in-depth
analysis of the appealsprocesses. It shows that the appealsprocesses are
sometimes dysfunctional and seldom used.
To improve the appeals processes, the Article recommends three
changes. First, once a regulator issues a material supervisory
determination, financial institutions should have direct access to a
dedicated appellateauthority outside of the examinationfunction. Second,
the appellate authority should engage in a robust review; it should
consider a broad scope of appealable matters and employ a clear and
rigorous standard of review. Third, regulators should release detailed
information about each decision reached by the appellate authority.
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INTRODUCTION

Financial institutions' are among the most heavily regulated businesses
in the United States. To ensure that institutions comply with the complex
web of laws, regulators conduct regular examinations. During an on-site
examination, regulators comb the institution's books, records, policies,
and practices, looking for evidence of legal infractions and financial stress.
Examiners then make a number of "material supervisory determinations"
("MSDs") about the institution's financial health and compliance with the
law.2 The examiners prepare an examination report detailing these
findings. In between on-site examinations, regulators collect and review
institutions' financial information, looking for potential issues. This
review can also lead to MSDs.
MSDs become the building blocks of regulatory enforcement. In cases
where MSDs suggest a financial institution needs to improve, regulators
employ formal or informal enforcement mechanisms to ensure that the
institution corrects any problems. For example, a regulator might issue a
cease-and-desist order instructing the institution to stop certain lending
activities.3 In more extreme cases, regulators might close the institution.4

1. As used in this Article, the terms "financial institution" and "institution" refer to banks, credit
unions, bank holding companies, and financial holding companies. In some circumstances, I
distinguish between "banks" (which are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
the Federal Reserve, and/or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) and "credit unions" (which are
regulated by the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund).
2. MSDs include "determinations relating to ... (i) examination ratings; (ii) the adequacy of
loan loss reserve provisions; and (iii) loan classifications on loans that are significant to an institution."
12 U.S.C. § 4806(f)(1)(A) (2012).
3. Id. §§ 1818(b), 1786(b).
4. Id. §§ 191, 1464(d), 1787(a), 1818(a)(2) (allowing for the govemment closure of financial
institutions).
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MSDs are often the initial findings that set the regulatory enforcement
mechanism in motion.
In the aftermath of the September 2008 financial market meltdown,
some financial institutions complain that regulators are trending toward
overly aggressive examination practices.5 At its root, dissatisfaction with
the examination process often indicates that institutions disagree with
examiners about MSDs. Some institutions believe that regulators do not
consistently apply existing law, claiming that "examiners tended to focus
too much on their own view of best practices rather than on legal and
regulatory requirements."6 Institutions also complain that regulators
change examination standards without warning. They claim that "[w]hat
was once A-OK is no longer A-OK, but no one knows that until after the
examination."7 Some reports even claim that examiners act with bias or
malice.
To guard against erroneous MSDs, financial institution regulators are
statutorily required to provide an "independent intra-agency appellate
process .. . to review material supervisory determinations made at insured
depository institutions." 9 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC"), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
("Federal Reserve"), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"),
and the National Credit Union Administration ("NCUA") have each
implemented a different procedure for handling these appeals.' 0

5. See, e.g., The FinancialInstitutions Examination Fairness and Reform Act: Hearingon H.R.
3461 Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servcs., 112th

&

Cong. 164 (2012) [hereinafter Hearingon H.R. 3461] (written statement of Noah Wilcox, President
CEO, Grand Rapids State Bank) ("There is an unmistakable trend toward arbitrary, micromanaged,
and unreasonably harsh examinations.").

6. Hearing on H.R. 3461, supranote 5, at 150 (statement of Ken Watts, President & CEO, West
Virginia Credit Union League).
7.

Bryan McKenzie,

Small Banks Struggle with New

Regulations, DAILY

PROGRESS

(Charlottesville, VA), Sept. 5, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 17668535 (quoting Patricia G.
Satterfield, President & CEO, Virginia Association of Community Banks). See also Steve Cocheo,
Tough Times on the Exam Front, ABA BANKING J., Nov. 2009, at 6 ("Management that was brilliant

two years ago running a CAMELS 1-rated bank now appears to be a bunch of idiots running a 4- or 5rated bank.") (quoting banking attorney Jeffrey Gerrish).
8. See Heather Anderson, OIG Dismisses Ohio Exam Claims, CREDIT UNION TIMES, Oct. 17,

2012, at 1, 20 (reporting on a credit union complaint that an examiner had introduced himself as "The
Liquidator," harassed credit union staff, and retaliated when the credit union appealed the exam
rating); George Waldon, Bank's Tif with the OCC Takes a Twist, ARK. Bus., Oct. 8, 2012, at 24
(reporting on an Arkansas bank's claim that it received a cease-and-desist order due to a "prejudicial
bias [that] flowed from something akin to personal animosity").
9. 12 U.S.C. § 4806(a) (2012).
10. See BANK APPEALS PROCESS, OCC BULLETIN 2013-15 (June 7, 2013) available at
http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2013/bulletin-2013-15.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
BS84-4CLH [hereinafter OCC BULLETIN 2013-15]; Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60
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Since regulators implemented the MSD appeals processes in 1995,
little has been done to analyze their effectiveness. Part of the reason for the
lack of scrutiny is that regulators keep much of the information about
appeals, including some decisions, secret." In addition, regulators
themselves have failed to conduct any serious study of the appeals
processes.1 2 Using data from MSD appeals (some of which I collected
through Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") requests) and my
interviews with top-level regulators," this Article provides the previously
untold story of these appeals.
The story is that of a dysfunctional and seldom-used system.
Regulators vary significantly in the reviews they provide through the MSD
appeals processes. They do not agree on which examiner determinations
are appealable or on the applicable standard of review. 14 Even considering
the state of the regulators' appeals policies, the rate of appeals is
astonishingly low. Thousands of financial institutions have been examined

Fed. Reg. 16,470 (Mar. 30, 1995); FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,055 (Mar. 23,
2012); NCUA, Guidelines for the Supervisory Review Committee, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,871 (Apr. 29,
2011); NCUA, Guidelines for the Supervisory Review Committee, 77 Fed. Reg. 322,004 (May 31,
2012).
11. See infra notes 130, 211,262, 336-37 and accompanying text.
12. In 2012, the Inspector General of each federal financial institution regulator reviewed its
agency's MSD appeals process. The reports generated from these reviews were far from scrutinizing.
After recounting the appeals process, the reports all noted that few institutions chose to appeal. None
of the reports offered extensive suggestions for improvement or compared the effectiveness of the
appeals processes across regulators. See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS: REVIEW OF OCC COMMUNITY BANK EXAMINATION AND
APPEALS PROCESSES (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/ig/

Audit%20Reports%20and%20Testimonies/OlGI2070.pdf,

archived at http://perma.cc/KP3A-XHYP

[hereinafter OCC OIG REPORT]; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS., AUDIT OF THE SMALL COMMUNITY BANK EXAMINATION PROCESS (2012), available at
[hereinafter
http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/files/Audit SCB ExamProcessAugust2012.pdf
FEDERAL RESERVE OIG REPORT]; FDIC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE FDIC's EXAMINATION
PROCESS FOR SMALL COMMUNITY BANKS (2012), available at http://www.fdicoig.gov/reportsl2/12-

011 AUD.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DQD6-R4Q9 [hereinafter FDIC OIG REPORT]; NCUA
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF NCUA'S EXAMINATION AND COMPLAINT PROCESSES FOR
(2012), available at http://www.ncua.gov/about/Leadership/CO/
UNIONS
CREDIT
SMALL

archived at http://perma.cc/KPG4-M4ND
OlG/Documents/OlG-12-IOReviewExamProcess.pdf,
[hereinafter NCUA OIG REPORT].
13. Interview with Samuel P. Golden, Managing Dir., Alvarez & Marsal, former Ombudsman,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, in Houston, Tex. (Nov. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Golden
Interview]; Telephone Interview with Larry L. Hattix, Senior Deputy Comptroller for Enterprise

&

Governance & Ombudsman, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (June 14. 2013) [hereinafter
Hattix Interview]; Telephone Interview with Joy K. Lee, Supervisory Review Comm. Chair
Ombudsman, Nat'l Credit Union Admin. (Apr. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Lee Interview]; Telephone
Interview with Hattie M. Ulan, Senior Ethics Counsel, former member Supervisory Review Comm.,
Nat'l Credit Union Admin. (June 18, 2013) [hereinafter Ulan Interview].
14. See generally infra Parts II.A.1, ILI, II.C.1, II.D.1 (discussing the appealable
determinations and standard of review used by each federal financial institution regulator).
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every year since regulators adopted their appeals processes in 1995. Yet
the OCC Ombudsman has issued only 157 decisions, the Federal Reserve
has decided just 25 appeals (although data from 1995-2000 are
unavailable for the Federal Reserve), the FDIC's Supervision Appeals
Review Committee has issued only 63 decisions, and the NCUA's
Supervisory Review Committee has issued 6 decisions." When
institutions do appeal, they seldom win. Most shockingly, the NCUA's
Supervisory Review Committee has overturned only one MSD-the
denial of a $5,000 grant reimbursement from the Office of Small Credit
Union Initiatives. 16
In light of the limited usefulness of the current MSD appeals processes,
I recommend three changes. First, all financial institution regulators
should adopt a consistent and broad scope of appealable matters. All
examination ratings should be appealable. Moreover, institutions should
be able to appeal MSDs that underlie enforcement actions if the financial
institution consented to the enforcement action. Second, all financial
institution regulators should adopt a consistent and robust standard of
review for evaluating appeals of MSDs. I favor a de novo standard of
review. Third, all financial institution regulators should release decisions
from appeals of MSDs. Although the decisions should be redacted
sufficiently to protect the anonymity of the appealing financial institution
and its customers, the released information should be complete enough to
allow institutions, regulators, and the public to learn how the agency reads
and applies relevant statutes and regulations. Although the reforms I
propose do not go as far as proposals that would create a single superOmbudsman to hear appeals from all financial institutions," my reforms
target observable weaknesses in the current processes.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief overview of
financial institution examinations. It then describes the creation of the
MSD appeals processes. Part II provides a description of the MSD appeals
processes as implemented by each federal regulator. It details not only the
rules governing the appeals processes, but also institutions' usage of the
processes. Part III discusses shortcomings of the current appeals processes,
and Part IV discusses recommendations for improvement.

15. The MSD appeals data in this article end in 2012.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 357-58.
17. See infra Part IV.D.
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I. REGULATORY STRUCTURE
Financial institutions are subject to a detailed and complex regulatory
structure. Reams of safety and soundness laws aim to keep institutions
solvent while additional regulations seek to ensure that institutions deal
fairly with consumers. Regulators ensure that institutions comply with
laws by employing examination and enforcement powers.
This part describes the financial institution examination and
enforcement system, paying particular attention to the role of MSDs in the
system. This part then describes the Congressional mandate that financial
institution regulators provide an "independent intra-agency appellate
process"' 8 to review MSDs.
A. Examination and Enforcement
Examinations are the cornerstone of a regulatory system designed to
keep financial institutions safe and sound. Regulators typically conduct a
yearly "full-scope, on-site examination" at each financial institution.' 9
During an examination, regulators visit a financial institution to review the
institution's policies, procedures, and records. Examiners then rate the
institution using the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System.20
Under the System, regulators evaluate the safety and soundness of
institutions using the "CAMEL" or "CAMELS" factors: capital, assets,
management, earnings, liquidity, and susceptibility to market risk.2 1

18. 12 U.S.C. § 4806(a) (2012).
19. 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d)(1) (2012). There are a few exceptions to this general rule. Statechartered banks may be examined by their federal regulator every other year if the state regulator
conducts an adequate examination during the year that the federal regulator does not. Id. § 1820(d)(3).
In addition, regulators may examine certain small, healthy, and well-managed banks on an eighteenmonth cycle. Id § 1820(d)(4). Federal regulators examine federally chartered credit unions on a
twelve-month cycle. See Examining the Health of the Credit Union Industry as We Emergefrom the
FinancialCrisis and Recover and Grow Our Economy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous., & Urban Affairs, 11Ith Cong. 6, 8, 25 (2010) (statement of Deborah Matz, Chairman, NCUA).
However, for federally-insured state-chartered credit unions, the federal regulator, "[tlo the maximum
extent feasible, . . . utilize[s] examinations conducted by state regulatory agencies." 12 C.F.R. § 741.1
(2014). The federal credit union regulator schedules examinations of state-chartered credit unions
"based on risk factors of individual credit unions." NCUA, EXAMINER'S GUIDE 26-4, available at
http://www.ncua.gov/Legal/GuidesEtc/Pages/Examiners-Guide.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). State
credit unions that are large, have received a previous poor examination rating, or pose other unique
risks are more likely to receive a federal examination. Id.
20. Fed. Fin. Insts. Examination Council, Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 61 Fed.
Reg. 67,021 (Dec. 19, 1996).
21. Id. "Federally insured credit unions are evaluated using the 'CAMEL' rating system, which is
substantially similar to the 'CAMELS' system without the 'S' component for rating Sensitivity to
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Regulators rate each item on a 1 to 5 scale, with a 1 rating being the
highest possible score.22 Examiners also award each institution a
composite rating meant to assess the overall condition of the institution.23
The composite score is not simply an average of the component ratings.
Rather, in issuing a composite rating the regulator considers the
components and "may incorporate any factor that bears significantly on
the [institution's] overall condition." 24
To arrive at the component rating and overall ratings, examiners must
make a number of additional conclusions about the institution. For
example, examiners will review loan documentation to determine whether
the institution has appropriately classified its risky loans and whether it
has adequately reserved for those loans. If the examiners find a large
amount of adversely classified loans when compared with the overall loan
portfolio, the examiners may rate the institution's assets as a 3, 4, or 5.
The examiners might also downgrade the institution's management rating
and composite rating based on the troubled loans.26
Although regulators do not publicly release safety and soundness
examination ratings,2 7 the ratings are serious business for financial
institutions. Institutions that receive a 3, 4, or 5 rating have at least "some
degree of supervisory concern." 28 Regulators commonly pursue formal
enforcement actions, such as written agreements, consent orders, ceaseand-desist orders, capital directives, and prompt corrective action
directives against institutions with these less-than-satisfactory ratings. 29
Formal enforcement actions can require an institution to undertake costly

market risk." OCC, FRB, FDIC, OTS, NCUA, Interagency Policy Statement on Funding and Liquidity
Risk Management, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,656, 13,665 n.19 (Mar. 22, 2010).
22. Fed. Fin. Insts. Examination Council, Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 61 Fed.
Reg. 67,021, 67,022.
23. Fed. Fin. Insts. Examination Council, Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 61 Fed.
Reg. 67,021, 67,025.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 67,027 (explaining that the asset quality rating depends on the level and severity of
classified assets).
26. See id at 67,027-28 (explaining that both the management rating and the composite rating
depend on the institution's ability to effectively manage risk).
27 See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 442 (5th ed. 2013).

28. Fed. Fin. Insts. Examination Council, Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 61 Fed.
Reg. 67,021, 67,026.
29. See Jim Rives, A Perspective on Regulatory Risk: Enforcement Actions and CAMELS, RMA

J., Mar. 2011, at 20. See also 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(8) (2012) (authorizing formal enforcement actions);
Julie Andersen Hill, Bank CapitalRegulation by Enforcement: An Empirical Study, 87 IND. L.J. 645,
658-62 (2012) (providing a more fulsome description of enforcement actions).
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remedial measures. 30 The CAMELS ratings are also used to determine the
price banks pay for deposit insurance. 3 1 As a result of a poor composite
examination rating, regulators may choose to downgrade an institution's
capital classification.32 This can, among other things, prevent a bank from
accepting brokered deposits 33 and restrict an institution's ability to grow.34
Finally, institutions that receive poor examination ratings may face
restrictions on the appointment of senior executive officers and directors. 35
In addition to the basic safety and soundness examination, regulators
conduct specialized examinations to assess trust department operations,36
information technology controls, 37 compliance with consumer protection

30. See What an Enforcement Order Will Cost Your Bank, BANK SAFETY & SOUNDNESS
ADVISOR, Nov. 22, 2010, at 1. Such an action can cost a "$100 million community bank ... between

$750,000 and $1 million in additional expenses, including hiring outside consultants, regulatory
counsel and increased FDIC insurance premiums." Id. For larger institutions, enforcement actions are
probably even more costly. 1d (noting that a $348.6 million community bank spent between $1 million
and $2 million on a cease-and-desist order).

31.

12 C.F.R. § 327.4; id pt. 327, subpt. A, app. A (2014). Credit unions, however, pay share

insurance premiums that are based on the institution's number of insured shares outstanding without

regard to the CAMEL rating. 12 U.S.C. § 1781(c)(2) (2012).
32. See 12 U.S.C. § 183 1o(g) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 325.103(d) (2014) (FDIC); id. § 208.43(c)
(Federal Reserve); id. § 702.102(b) (NCUA); id. § 6.4(d) (OCC).
33. See 12 U.S.C. § 183 1f(a) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 337.6(b)(3)(i) (2014). Credit unions tend to
"rely less on brokered sources of funds than banks." Letter from Dennis Dollar, Acting Chairman,

NCUA to Federally Insured Credit Unions (July 2001), available at http://www.ncua.gov/
Resources/Documents/LCU2001-08.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4TGG-HKR8. Thus, credit union
regulations do not contain similar restrictions on brokered share accounts.

34. See 12 U.S.C.

§ 1831o(e)(3)

-(4) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 702.202(a)(3)-(4) (2014) (explaining

that an undercapitalized institution cannot increase its average total assets, acquire any company,
establish new branches, or enter new lines of business without regulator approval).

35. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 5.5 1(d) (2014) (requiring that a bank that is not adequately capitalized
provide 90 days notice to the OCC before making changes to the board of directors or senior
management); id. § 701.14(c) (requiring that a federally-insured credit union that receives a 4 or 5

composite rating provide 30 days notice before makings changes to the board of directors or senior
management). Banks may also face restrictions on golden parachutes-payments made to employees
as a condition of terminating their employment. See id. § 359.
36. See generally OCC, BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS: COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK 12, 72-89
(2014); Div. OF BANKING SUPERVISION & REGULATION, FED. RESERVE, COMMERCIAL BANK
EXAMINATION MANUAL §§ 4200.1, 6010.1 (2014), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/supmanual/cbem/cbem.pdf [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE EXAM MANUAL]; FDIC, TRUST
EXAMINATION MANUAL (2005), available at https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/
trustmanual/. The NCUA does not use the Uniform Interagency Trust Rating System. See Fed. Fin.

Insts. Examination Council, Uniform Interagency Trust Rating Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. 54,704 (Oct. 13,
1998).
37.

See generally FFIEC, IT EXAMINATION HANDBOOK INFOBASE: IT BOOKLETS, available at

http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/it-booklets.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
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laws,38 performance under the Community Reinvestment Act, 3 9 and
compliance with Bank Secrecy Act and other anti-money laundering
laws. 40 Like the safety and soundness examination, the specialized
examinations involve regulators making MSDs. Adverse findings can lead
to enforcement actions or other negative consequences for the institution.4
In the event that a regulator issues an erroneous MSD, it is important
for the receiving institution to get that determination corrected quickly. As
regulators ramp up their enforcement efforts to correct a perceived
problem, an institution may have little opportunity for redress. Regulators
can issue some enforcement actions, such as capital directives (actions that
order an institution to improve its capital ratios), without providing the
institution a pre-order hearing.42 Even in circumstances where the law
allows for a pre-order hearing, institutions often forego the hearing,
believing there is little chance for redress when regulators have such broad
discretion.43 When institutions do go to the trouble of contesting an order
at a hearing, appealing to an administrative law judge, and then appealing
to a federal district court, courts' limited power to review these cases
ensures that regulators almost always win." The prospects are even

38. In a compliance examination, regulators visit the institution to assess conformity with fair
lending laws, consumer disclosure laws, unfair or abusive practice laws, and privacy laws. See
generally OCC, BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS: COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK 12, 90-93 (2014); Div.
OF CONSUMER & CMTY. AFFAIRS, FEDERAL RESERVE, CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK (2014);
FDIC, COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL (2014); NCUA, EXAMINER'S GUIDE ch. 19, available at

http://www.ncua.gov/Legal/GuidesEtc/Pages/Examiners-Guide.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
39. See generally OCC, BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS: COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK 12, 94-105
(2014); Div. OF CONSUMER & CMTY. AFFAIRS, FED. RESERVE, CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK

ch. VI.99 (2014); FDIC, COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL ch. XI (2014). Credit unions are not
included within the scope of the Community Reinvestment Act and are not subject to Community

Reinvestment Act examinations. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(c)(2), 2902-03 (2012).
40. In a Bank Secrecy Act/anti-money laundering examination, regulators assess an institution's
compliance with laws designed to help law enforcement officials "identify the source, volume, and
movement of currency and other monetary instruments." FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL,
BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL 7 (2010).

41. For example, although the Community Reinvestment Act does not generally allow regulators
to bring enforcement actions against banks that do not adequately serve the credit needs of the
community, the examiner's report is publicly released. See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note

27, at 361. Thus, any adverse finding may damage the institution's reputation.
42. See FDIC v. Bank of Coushatta, 930 F.2d 1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1991).
43.

See Joseph T. Lynyak Ill, Responding to Capital Directives and Related Enforcement

Actions, 129 BANKING L.J. 387, 390 (2012) ("[B]ecause the Bank Regulators' enforcement
alternatives are so expansive[,] . . . banks do not elect to contest administratively the issuance of a
package of capital-related orders.").
44. See, e.g., Frontier State Bank v. FDIC, 702 F.3d 588, 597 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that a
regulator's decision to set an individual bank minimum capital requirement in a cease-and-desist order

was not subject to judicial review because Congress granted complete discretion to bank regulators);
Greene Cnty. Bank v. FDIC, 92 F.3d 633, 636 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that a regulator's conclusion
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grimmer for institutions that are closed by their regulators. If an institution
waits until it is closed to raise regulatory concerns, it will likely be
impossible to obtain adequate redress.45
In some administrative settings, elected officials, the media, and the
court of public opinion serve as additional safety valves for regulated
entities that are unhappy with the administrative process. Financial
institutions, however, are constrained in their ability to raise institutionspecific concerns with anyone other than their attorneys, accountants, and
regulators. Examination reports remain the property of the regulator even
after they have been issued to the bank.46 The institution cannot disclose
nonpublic examination information without risking administrative and
criminal sanctions.47
For their part, regulators should also have an interest in correcting
erroneous MSDs. Pursuing unnecessary enforcement actions diverts
regulatory attention from pressing problems. If a financial institution
expends significant time and effort addressing an erroneous determination,
it may prevent the institution from addressing other important matters.
Moreover, allowing erroneous MSDs to persist undermines the credibility
of the supervisory process.

that a bank had not complied with a memorandum of understanding was supported by substantial

evidence).
45. Can You Sue to Reverse a Receivership, BANK SAFETY & SOUNDNESS ADVISOR, Apr. 4.
2011, at I (explaining that regulators have broad power to close any financial institution with an
"unsafe or unsound condition" and even if the regulator acts improperly the financial institution's
assets will likely have been sold to others before the legal challenge concludes). See also Lynyak,

supra note 43, at 397 ("Although there are instances in which the closing of a bank may be viewed by
stakeholders as unfair or perhaps illegal, there are no modem instances in which a bank closing has

been reversed or enjoined.").
46. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 4.32(b)(2), 4.36 (2014) (OCC); id. §§ 309.5(g)(8), 309.6(a), 350.9 (FDIC);
id. §§ 261.2(c)(1), 261.20(g), 261.22(e) (Federal Reserve); id. § 792.30 (2014) (NCUA).
47. See Press Release, OCC, FDIC, Fed. Reserve & OTS, Interagency Advisory on the
Confidentiality of the Supervisory Rating and Other Nonpublic Supervisory Information (Feb. 28,
2005), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2005/prl805a.html, archivedat http://perma.

cc/YZ4Q-EEMC (citing the criminal penalties associated with 18 U.S.C. § 641); Material Supervisory
Determination Decision of Dec. 10, 1999, SARC-99-07 (FDIC Dec. 10, 1999), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/sarc/sarcappeals/sarc9907.html,

archived at http://perma.cc/

5MK8-ZXTR (upholding an examiner determination that a bank had violated "Section 309.6 of FDIC
Rules and Regulations, which prohibits disclosure of confidential supervisory information, without the
prior approval of the FDIC" when the bank "copied individual members of Congress and the General
Accounting Office . . . on its appeal of' an examination rating); Director Banned for Disclosing

CAMEL Rating, CREDIT UNION J., Apr. 2, 2012, at 1 (reporting that the NCUA had banned a credit
union director from associating with any credit union because he publicly disclosed a credit union

CAMEL rating).
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B. Appealing MaterialSupervisory Determinations
Although both regulators and financial institutions have an interest in
correcting erroneous MSDs, regulators were slow to allow appeals. The
OCC was the first. In 1993, Comptroller Eugene A. Ludwig created the
Office of the Ombudsman to handle MSD appeals. 48 He appointed Samuel
P. Golden, an OCC examiner, as the first Ombudsman. 4 9 At the time,
financial institutions and their regulators were still trying to recover from
the banking crises of the 1980s. 50 Some banks that had weathered the
crises began to complain about the fairness of the bank examination
process. They asked newly elected President Bill Clinton and Comptroller
Ludwig for an independent avenue for appealing MSDs.si Comptroller
Ludwig obliged.52
The OCC's new Ombudsman operated outside of the OCC's
supervisory function, instead reporting directly to the Comptroller. 53 The
appeals process itself looked like binding arbitration.54 A bank would
submit a written appeal describing what it believed was an erroneous
determination. The Ombudsman would then contact the OCC examination

48. Eugene A. Ludwig, Column: After Dodd-Frank, More Ombudsmen, AM. BANKER, Sept. 16,
2010, at 9. Technically, the FDIC announced an informal policy for reviewing supervisory decisions in

early 1992, but the policy was short on details and only provided that the Division of Supervision
Director would "make a good faith effort to evaluate and resolve" written complaints from banks.
FDIC, Fin. Inst. Letter 11-92, Procedures for Requesting Review of Supervisory Decisions (Feb. 7,
1992), available at 1992 WL 714970.
49.

Stephen Goldstein, MetropolitanMoney Movers & Shakers, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993, at

B5.
50. See generally AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990s,
in I Div. OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS, FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES-LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

(1997), available at https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/ (explaining that a collapse of energy
prices, real estate downturns, and an agricultural recession all combined to stress the banking

industry).
51.

Golden Interview, supra note 13 ("On [President Clinton's] transition team ...

there were

several key bankers from some of the largest banks in the country who said, 'You need something to
provide an avenue that when we disagree with the bank examiners that you don't go to the fox in the
henhouse . . . .').

52. OCC Banking Circular No. 272 (June 11, 1993).
53. Appeals Process, 13 OCC Q.J., no. 1, 1993-1994, at 61; Steve Cocheo, OCC's First
Ombudsman Hangs Out His Shingle, ABA BANKING J., Oct. 1993, at 6. The office was initially
located in Houston, Texas in part to create an appearance of objectivity. Barbara A. Rehm, Former
Examiner Ready for Job as OCC's ComplaintDepartment, AM. BANKER, Sept. 9, 1993, at 18.

54. Golden Interview, supra note 13 ("[T]he [appeals] process is binding arbitration because you
listen to both sides, you go through, and you make a de novo separate decision on what is the right
outcome.").
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staff for its written response and the relevant OCC documents.55 In most
cases, Ombudsman Golden or his staff5 6 would visit the appealing bank to

make an independent assessment.5 7 The Ombudsman would then issue a
new and binding decision-a decision that could be more severe or more
lenient than the decision reached by the examination staff.58
According to Ombudsman Golden, his office was initially "inundated"
with appeals. 59 Banks were complimentary of the new appeals process and
sometimes even more complimentary of Ombudsman Golden. After a
northern California bank successfully appealed a "needs to improve"
rating under the Community Reinvestment Act, the bank's chief executive
officer effused: "(Mr. Golden) is probably the best thing to happen to the
OCC in a long time ... . He's bringing a discipline to the agency that is
long overdue." 6 0
Banks not regulated by the OCC took note and wanted other regulators
62
Based in part on the initial success of the
to adopt a similar process.61
OCC appeals process, 62 Congress mandated that each banking regulator
provide an "independent intra-agency appellate process . .. to review

material supervisory determinations made at insured depository
institutions."63 Congress expected that the MSD appeals processes would

55.

OCC Banking Circular No. 272 (June 11, 1993). Ombudsman Golden explained: "There

were no forms that [were] required; there was no infrastructure that's required. You simply frame[d]
the issue that you [had]." Golden Interview, supra note 13.

56.

The OCC Ombudsman's Office initially consisted of Ombudsman Golden and a single

administrative assistant, but it hired three additional staff members in the first year. Rehm, supra note
53, at 18; Golden Interview, supra note 13.
57. OCC policy allowed both examination staff and bank management the opportunity to request

a telephone or in-person meeting. See OCC Banking Circular No. 272 (June 11, 1993). Under the
direction of Ombudsman Golden, staff from the Ombudsman's Office would almost always visit the
bank. Golden Interview, supra note 13.
58. Appeals Process,supra note 53, at 61.
59. Golden Interview, supra note 13. See also Bill Atkinson, Bankers Not Shy About Appealing

OCC Decisions, AM. BANKER, Jan. 31, 1994, at 6.
60.

Terrence O'Hara, To Feisty CEO, 'Needs to Improve' Meant War, AM. BANKER, May 17,

1994, at 8 (quoting Carl J. Schmitt, Chairman & CEO, Univ. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.).
61. Golden Interview, supra note 13 ("[The FDIC and Federal Reserve] would not have
independently [created an independent MSD appeals process] had it not been for state banks who said,
'Why do national banks have that and we don't?' So that's when Congress essentially mandated that

they would do it."'). It is not clear whether credit unions were equally interested in an appeals process.
See Ulan Interview, supra note 13 (stating that she did not recall credit unions "clamoring for [an
appeals] process").
62. OCC REPORT OF THE OMBUDSMAN 1995-1996, at 3 (1997).
63. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-325, § 309(a), 108 Stat. 2160, 2218 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4806(a) (2012)). The statute applies
to "each appropriate Federal banking agency and the National Credit Union Administration Board." Id.
"Federal banking agency" is currently defined to include only the OCC, Federal Reserve, and FDIC.
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(q), 4801(1) (2012). The newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
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"provide an avenue of redress for insured depository institutions ... from
uneven treatment by examiners."64
The appeals process must provide "a review by an agency official who
does not directly or indirectly report to the agency official who made the
material supervisory determination under review."6 5 Regulators must also
provide appropriate safeguards to protect financial institutions that appeal
from retaliation by the regulator.6 6
Appealable MSDs are defined to include "examination ratings," "the
adequacy of loan loss reserve provisions," and "loan classifications on
loans that are significant to an institution."67 However, MSDs do not
include regulators' decisions to close financial institutions or take prompt
corrective action, including the removal of officers and directors from
undercapitalized institutions. 68 Furthermore, the MSD appeals process
does not "affect the authority of an appropriate Federal banking agency or
the National Credit Union Administration Board to take enforcement or
supervisory action." 6 9

("CFPB"), although generally thought of as an additional bank regulator, does not fall within the ambit
of the statute. The CFPB has voluntarily established a supervisory appeals process, but notes that it "is
not intended to nor should it be construed to . .. create or confer upon any person, including one who
is the subject of CFPB supervisory, investigation or enforcement activity, any substantive or

procedural rights or defenses that are enforceable in any manner." CFPB Bulletin 2012-07, Appeals of
Supervisory Matters 2 n.1 (Oct. 31, 2012), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/f/2Ol210
cfpb bulletin supervisory-appeals-process.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/24H6-WE6P. There is no
substantive reason that the CFPB should not be required by statute to provide an appeals process on
par with other financial institution regulators.
64. S. REP. No. 103-169, at 51 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881, 1935 (explaining
that "[e]venhandedness is important to maintain confidence in our regulatory system").

65. 12 U.S.C. § 4806(f)(2) (2012). The statute provides only for "intra-agency" agency appeals
processes. Id. § 4806(a). It does not address whether an MSD may be further appealed in federal court.

See Donald R. Cassling, Banks Must Pursue All Agency Appeal Procedures Prior to Filing Suit
Against the OCC, 121 BANKING L.J. 760, 762 (2004) ("As Section 4806 does not directly authorize
judicial review of OCC deicisons, [financial institutions] must provide that a final agency action
occurred."). In Peoples Nat'1 Bank v. OCC, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
explained in dicta that a bank may bring a claim in federal court under the Administrative Procedure

Act after exhausting the MSD intra-agency process. 362 F.d 333, 336-37 (2004) (dismissing an appeal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the bank had not filed an intra-agency appeal). However, I
was unable to locate any judicial appeal of a decision made through any of the regulators' MSD
appeals processes. Because this article focuses on the intra-agency appeals processes, I do not further
address the potential availability of'judicial review.

66.
67.
68.
69.

12
Id.
Id.
Id.

U.S.C. § 4806(b)(2) (2012).
§ 4806(f)(1)(A).
§ 4806(f)(1)(B).
§ 4806(g).
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II. APPEALS PROCESSES BY REGULATOR
Each federal financial institution regulator has taken a different path for
providing the intra-agency review process required by statute. This Part
first provides a description of each regulator's MSD appeals process. It
then describes how institutions have used the appeals processes. This Part
draws on information from my interviews of past and current regulators
who handle (or handled) MSD appeals.o It also reports appeals data I
gathered from public sources and through FOIA requests. While some
information about MSD appeals is still not available, this Part provides the
most comprehensive look at the MSD appeals processes to date.

A. OCC
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency supervises banks and
thrifts with national charters. In 2012, OCC oversaw 1783 banks,7 2
including all of the largest U.S. banks-Bank of America, Wells Fargo
Bank, JP Morgan Chase, Citibank, U.S. Bank, and PNC Bank.7 ' Although
the OCC is often thought of as the large bank regulator, it also supervises
about 1500 banks with less than $1 billion in assets.74 The OCC has 3823
full-time equivalent employees.75

70.

I sought interviews with many past and current agency officials. The Federal Reserve has

adopted a process that essentially creates an ad hoc review committee for each appeal. See infra notes

169-70 and accompanying text. Thus, it was impossible to identify an individual who could give a
first-person account of the functioning of the appeals process as a whole. My attempts to secure

interviews with FDIC officials were unsuccessful. I did, however, gather significant information from
interviews of past and current OCC Ombudsmen and past and current members of the NCUA's
Supervisory Review Committee. See supra note 13.
71. About the OCC, OCC, http://www.occ.treas.gov/aboutocc.htm, archivedat http://perma.cc/

9G6Z-AETA (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). In 2011, the OCC gained regulatory authority over national
thrifts when the Dodd-Frank Act shuttered the Office of Thrift Supervision. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5411-12
(2012).
72. See Find Banks, FDIC, https://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp (search with Information as of
Dec. 31, 2012 and Federal Regulator as Comptroller of the Currency) (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
73. See Summary of Deposits, FDIC, http://www2.fdic.gov/sod/ (linking to Summary Tables,
which provides a table for the June 30, 2012 report for the Top 50 Commercial Banks and Savings
Institutions by Deposits).

74. See FindBanks, FDIC, https://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp (search with Information as of
Dec. 31, 2012, Size or Performance as Total Assets ($) Equal or Less Than S1,000,000,000, and
Federal Regulator as Comptroller of the Currency) (last visited Feb. 26, 2015).
75.

OCC, AR-2012, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2012, inside front cover.
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1. OCC Appeals Process
As discussed in Part I.B, the OCC was the first federal bank regulator
to establish an independent MSD appeals process. Because the
Congressional mandate was based on the OCC's existing process, 6 the
statute did not require changes at the OCC. Since 1994, the OCC has
updated its procedures on four occasions, but the basic structure of the
77
appeals process remains the same.
Under current OCC guidelines, 8 banks are encouraged to first attempt
to resolve any disagreement with examiners informally during the
examination process.79 If a bank is dissatisfied with informal attempts to
resolve the disputed MSD, the bank may initiate a formal appeal with
either the Ombudsman or the Deputy Comptroller of the supervisory
district that oversees the bank.8 0 The choice of whether to file an appeal
with the Ombudsman or Deputy Comptroller is left to the discretion of the
appealing bank.81 Although the Deputy Comptroller oversees the
supervisory function that led to the initial MSD,82 the Ombudsman
"operates independently from the bank supervision process and reports
directly to the Comptroller of the Currency." 83 Since the OCC established
the MSD appeals process, it has had only two Ombudsmen: Samuel P.
Golden (1993-2008) and Larry L. Hattix (2008-present).84 The OCC

76.

See supranotes 61-63 and accompanying text.

77. The OCC revised the procedures in 1996, 2002, 2011, and 2013. See OCC, Independent
Regulatory Appeals Process, 61 Fed. Reg. 7,042 (Feb. 23, 1996); National Bank Appeals Process,
OCC Bulletin 1996-18 (Feb. 23, 1996); National Bank Appeals Process, OCC Bulletin 2002-9 (Feb.
25, 2002); Bank Appeals Process, OCC Bulletin 2011-44 (Nov. 1, 2011); OCC BULLETIN 2013-15,
supra note 10.
78. OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supra note 10; OCC, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL (PPM)
1000-9 (REVISED), ADMINISTERING BANK APPEALS (June 3, 2013) [hereinafter OCC PPM 1000-9]

(acquired through a Freedom of Information Act request, copy on file with author); OCC, APPEALS
PROCESS FOR NATIONAL BANKS AND

FEDERAL SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS (2013), available at

http://www.occ.gov/topics/dispute-resolution/bank-appeals/bank-appeals-process-brochure.pdf,
archivedat http://perma.cc/GYQ6-E936 [hereinafter OCC BANK APPEALS PROCESS BROCHURE].

79. OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supranote 10; OCC PPM 1000-9, supranote 78.
80. OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supranote 10.
81. Id.
82. See id ("A formal appeal to the Deputy Comptroller shall be filed with the Deputy
Comptroller responsible for the unit that issued the decision or action in dispute.").
83. Id.
84. Press Release, OCC, The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Names Larry Hattix to
be Ombudsman (Feb. 8, 2008), available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2008/
nr-occ-2008-12.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3LND-BDYV. Before becoming Ombudsman both
men had lengthy careers as OCC examiners. Id.
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Ombudsman's office currently has two other seasoned former examiners
dedicated to the appeals function full-time.8
Whether the bank chooses to start its appeal with the Deputy
Comptroller or the Ombudsman, it must submit a written document fully
describing the matter in dispute.86 The bank's appeal must "include the
supervisory standards that the bank deems were inappropriately applied by
OCC officials." 7 The bank must also show that its board of directors has
approved the appeal.8 8 While some institutions choose to have outside
attorneys prepare the appeals documentation, the OCC's process is
designed to be simple enough that banks can pursue appeals without
attorneys. 89
If a bank appeals to the Deputy Comptroller, the Deputy Comptroller
then "contacts the bank to discuss the appeals process and applicable
supervisory standards related to the issue(s) in dispute, and to ensure that
he or she has all the information needed to determine if the issue(s) in
dispute are appealable." 90 The Deputy Comptroller also contacts OCC
examination staff to get a "written response to the appeal."9 1 If the Deputy
Comptroller or his or her supervisor "participated in making the decision
under review, he or she must transfer the appeal to the Ombudsman." 92
Under normal circumstances, the Deputy Comptroller will issue a written
decision letter within forty-five days. 93
If the bank is unhappy with the Deputy Comptroller's decision or
prefers to begin the appeal with an independent party, 9 4 the bank can
appeal to the Ombudsman. Like the Deputy Comptroller, the Ombudsman
must contact the bank to discuss the appeal and seek a response to the
appeal from OCC examination staff.9 5 In some cases, the Ombudsman or

85.

Hattix Interview, supra note 13. Three additional Ombudsman Office employees assist with

the appeals function as needed. Id The Ombudsman calls on other experts throughout the OCC to help
with appeals on a case-by-case basis. Id
86. OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supra note 10.
87. Id. See also OCC PPM 1000-9, supra note 78 (stating that a formal appeal should include
"[s]upervisory standards (i.e., law citation or supervisory
inaccurately").
88. oCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supra note 10.
89. Hattix Interview, supra note 13.

guidance)

thought to be

applied

90. OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supra note 10.
91. Id
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Because the Deputy Comptroller oversees the examination function, some banks may fear
retaliation is more likely if the first appeal is filed with the Deputy Comptroller. The OCC's process
allows these banks to bypass the Deputy Comptroller.
95. OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supranote 10.
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his staff visits the appealing bank.96 Under normal circumstances, the
Ombudsman will reach a decision within forty-five days of the filing of
the appeal.97
Banks may use the MSD appeals process to challenge a wide variety of
determinations. In addition to examination ratings, allowances for loan and
lease losses, and loan classifications (all of which are appealable under the
statute itself),9 8 OCC guidance allows banks to appeal violations of law,
fair-lending-related decisions, licensing decisions, and other "[m]aterial
supervisory determinations such as matters requiring attention, compliance
with enforcement actions, or other conclusions in the report of
examination." 99 The OCC guidance specifically excludes some matters
from review, including formal enforcement actions and "other agency
decisions that are subject to judicial review other than those described in
the" OCC guidance. 00 For the purposes of the guidance, "a formal
enforcement-related action or decision includes the underlying facts that
form the basis of a recommended or pending formal enforcement action
and the acts or practices that are the subject of a pending formal
enforcement action."'0 ' The guidance, however, leaves open the possibility
of appeal for informal enforcement actions (like memoranda of
understanding) and also allows room for banks to challenge examination
ratings and other examination conclusions while under formal
enforcement actions.102

96. Hattix Interview, supra note 13 ("There have been . . . occasions when sometimes I will visit
[the appealing bank] if I think that that's appropriate. There's times also when the banks have asked if
they can come in, and we always allow that. . . . [B]ut it's not the majority. It's the minority."). In
contrast Mr. Hattix's predecessor, Ombudsman Samuel P. Golden, reports that he or his staff nearly

always visited appealing banks. He explains:
Most of the time, if I want to know how you live, I'm going to go to your house. You can tell
me about how you live, and then I go to your house and it is junky as hell. You know,

seriously. If you want to know the real facts, you literally go. So ninety-five percent of the
time we went to the bank.
Golden Interview, supra note 13.

97. Hattix Interview, supra note 13 ("[O]ur goal is to try and get things resolved within forty-five
days. Right now we are probably averaging probably closer to sixty, and I think that that has to do with
the types of cases that we are getting right now with the economy being what it is."). See also OCC
BULLETIN 2013-15, supra note 10.

98. 12 U.S.C. § 4806(f)(1)(A) (2012).
99. OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supranote 10.
100. Id. Additionally, banks may not appeal decisions to close a bank, preliminary conclusions
that have not yet been finalized, formal or informal rulemaking, formal or informal adjudications
under the Administrative Procedures Act, or FOIA decisions. Id
101. Id
102. See id. ("While banks may not appeal a decision by the supervisory office to pursue a formal
enforcement-related action, banks may appeal conclusions in the [report of examination]."); Hattix
Interview, supra note 13 ("[I]f you're under an enforcement agreement and that's what you are
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Once a bank submits an appeal, the Deputy Comptroller or the
Ombudsman has seven days to determine whether the appeal concerns an
appealable matter. 0 3 Ombudsman Hattix urges all banks with examination
complaints to bring them to the Ombudsman.1'0 He believes the OCC's
authority on appeal is often broader than banks believe. 0 5 In the event the
matter is not considered an MSD, the Ombudsman may still be able to
serve as an informal mediator between the bank and the OCC's
examination staff.1 06
Banks cannot use the appeals process to delay compliance with a
formal enforcement action. According to OCC guidance:
As a general matter, decisions and actions in dispute are not stayed
during the pursuit of an appeal. In the appropriate circumstances,
however, the Ombudsman or the appropriate OCC official, upon
written request of a bank, may relieve the bank of the obligation to
comply with a supervisory decision or action while the supervisory
appeal is pending. 0 7

Ombudsman Hattix explains that, although the Ombudsman's Office has
issued stays, stays are generally only appropriate when the appealing bank
would suffer irreparable harm by complying with the supervisory
decision.

08

OCC guidance does not provide a clear standard of review for the
Ombudsman or Deputy Comptroller in deciding appeals. The guidance
notes that when a bank appeals conclusions in a report of examination
while subject to a formal enforcement action, "the appeal is limited to a
consideration of whether the examiners appropriately applied agency
policies and standards."'0 9 The guidance is otherwise silent about the
standard of review.
Other OCC statements are ambiguous about the standard of review for
MSD appeals. An OCC brochure provided to bankers and examiners

appealing, the enforcement document itself, then we could probably say, 'Yeah, that's probably not
going to be appealable.' But a lot of times, the underlying factors, you know, your ratings, you can still
appeal.").
103. OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supra note 10.
104.

Hattix Interview, supra note 13.

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supra note 10.
108. Hattix Interview, supra note 13 (explaining that if an MSD had instructed a bank to
reimburse customers for fair lending violations, a stay might be appropriate while the Ombudsman
reviewed the violation).
109. OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supranote 10.
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explains that the "Ombudsman provides an independent and objective
review to determine if supervisory decisions are reasonable based on
available facts." 110 It also notes that "[e]xaminers can be assured that fair,
impartial review of appeals will support reasonable decisions based on
available facts according to existing standards and guidance."' Perhaps
this means the Deputy Comptroller and the Ombudsman decide only
whether examiner decisions are within a range of reasonablenesssomething less than a full de novo review of the facts underlying the
dispute and the determinations of the examination staff.
Former OCC Ombudsman Samuel P. Golden appears to have taken the
position that because statutes, regulations, and guidelines did not explicitly
narrow the standard of review, he was free to reconsider all findings of
fact and conclusions of law. Ombudsman Golden explained that, in
general, he employed a de novo standard of review.11 2 He was free to
make a new determination-including a determination that was harsher
than the one reached in the initial examination. On most occasions, Mr.
Golden and his staff would visit the bank to make their own assessment of
underlying facts. 13
Current Ombudsman Larry L. Hattix does not use the phrase de novo
when describing the MSD standard of review. Instead, he describes his
decisions as "standard based." 1 4 For example, if a bank were appealing a
loan classification, he would ask both the bank and the examination staff
to explain how the loan complies with the OCC's standards for classifying
loans. The Ombudsman would then "look at the standards and say, 'Was it
applied appropriately or not?""' 5 Under this approach Mr. Hattix explains
that he is "not giving deference to either side.""'6 On the one hand Mr.

110.

oCC BANK APPEALS

PROCESS BROCHURE, supra note 78.

111. Id
112. Golden Interview, supra note 13 ("Most appeals were de novo, which means this: If you
appeal it, what you are asking for is a reassessment of the facts and circumstances and a decision that

you believe is fair and balanced. And so what I had was the opportunity to go back and not be bound
by the decision that the exam team had made. And that 'not being bound by' means that I could
change it in any way that we believed that our analysis, the facts and circumstances were that led to the

decision.").
113. Id. While Ombudsman Golden reviewed most appeals de novo, he used a more limited
standard of review for appeals involving banks with formal enforcement actions. Id. In those cases, the

Ombudsman had to "take the same facts and circumstances that the exam team had," and then
determine whether the examiners' decisions "were consistent with the examination guidelines." Id.

The OCC's review of findings related to enforcement action is more limited now. See OCC BULLETIN
2013-15, supra note 10; Hearingon H.R. 3461, supra note 5, at 53 (testimony of Eugene A. Ludwig,
Founder & CEO, Promontory Financial Group, LLC).
114.

Hattix Interview, supra note 13.

115. Id.
116. Id.
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Hattix's review seems the equivalent of a de novo standard: the
Ombudsman looks at the facts and makes his own determination about
how those facts comport with OCC regulations and policies rather than
relying on the initial factfmder's (the examiner's) conclusions of law. On
the other hand, this description makes no mention of how the Ombudsman
might resolve questions of fact. Without a visit to the bank, the
Ombudsman may have little way of resolving questions of fact without
giving deference to earlier factfinders. Perhaps cases involving questions
of fact are rare instances that are resolved de novo by the Ombudsman by
visiting the bank. However, Ombudsman Golden often visited banks, but
Ombudsman Hattix rarely does so." 7 Perhaps the fewer visits suggest that
Ombudsman Hattix uses a different standard than Ombudsman Golden did
when reviewing factual disputes.' 18
Regardless of the standard of review, once the Ombudsman has
reached a decision, he issues a written response to both the bank and the
examination staff." 9 The Ombudsman also publishes summaries of each
decision. 120 This disclosure is meant to "provide transparency and
openness in [the OCC's] decision-making process,"'21 while still
maintaining the confidentiality of the appealing bank and its customers.1 22
The OCC appeals guidelines include a process designed to discourage
examiner retaliation. After an appeal, the Ombudsman must contact the
bank twice to ask whether retaliation has occurred.1 23 If a bank reports
retaliation, the Ombudsman investigates.1 24 "If the Ombudsman finds that
retaliation has occurred, he or she will forward the complaint directly to
the Inspector General." 25 Ombudsman Hattix reported that, on a few
occasions, he has forwarded complaints to the Inspector General for

117. See supra note 96.
118. The OCC guidance does not provide distinctions between a Deputy Comptroller appeal and
an Ombudsman appeal that suggest these officials might employ a different standard of review. See
OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supra note 10. However, because I did not interview any Deputy

Comptrollers, it is hard to know whether they approach appeals like the Ombudsmen.
119.
120.

Id.
See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.

121. Rachel Witkowski, OCC s Ombudsman Opposes Appeal Reform Bill, AM. BANKER, Apr. 19,
2012, available at 2012 WLNR 8174226 (quoting OCC Ombudsman Larry L. Hattix).
122.

Golden Interview, supra note 13 (noting that, while it was usually possible to preserve

confidentiality while still having meaningful disclosure, occasionally "the summaries had to be
neutered to the point where it was difficult to" fully describe the appeal).
123. OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supra note 10 ("The Ombudsman will contact bank management

(1) 60 days after the date of the decision letter and (2) 60 days after the completion of the first
examination of the appellant bank following its appeal."). Banks may also contact the Ombudsman
about retaliation at their convenience. Id.

124. Id.
125.

Id.
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further investigation.1 26 The OCC guidance warns that "[a]ppropriate
action, including disciplinary action consistent with OCC policies, will be
taken as warranted.", 27 The Ombudsman also has authority to
"recommend to the Comptroller that the next examination of the bank
exclude personnel involved in the ruling appealed by the bank."I 28
2. OCC Appeals
Banks supervised by the OCC may file an initial appeal with either the
Ombudsman or the Deputy Comptroller of the supervisory district that
oversees the bank.1 2 9 The OCC does not provide any public information
about Deputy Comptroller appeals. Through FOIA, I requested
information on Deputy Comptroller appeals since January 1, 1993. In
response, I received a list summarizing 11 appeals.1 30 Of those appeals, 4
involved examination findings, and 3 involved composite and component
ratings. There was 1 appeal each for a licensing decision, a supervisory
letter, a Community Reinvestment Act rating, and a loan classification. Of
the 11 appeals, 6 upheld the examiner decision, 2 reversed the examiner
decision, 2 partially reversed the examiner decision, and I appeal was
withdrawn. Only 3 Deputy Comptroller decisions were appealed to the
Ombudsman.
These FOIA data appear incomplete. The earliest decision included in
the list of Deputy Comptroller appeals is dated 2002.'"' It is unlikely there
were no appeals prior to 2002. Indeed, 3 Ombudsman opinions in 1994
and 1 in 2000 indicate that they were appeals from Deputy Comptroller
decisions. Data for later appeals may also be incomplete.1 3 2

126.
127.

Hattix Interview, supra note 13.
OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supra note 10. Ombudsman Hattix explains that disciplinary action

might be taken by either the Inspector General or the Ombudsman. Hattix Interview, supranote 13.
128. OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supra note 10 (noting that "[tihe Comptroller will make the final
decision on any such exclusion").
129.

See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.

130. Letter from Frank D. Vance, Jr., Manager, Disclosure Services & FOIA Officer, OCC to
author (Feb. 28, 2014) (on file with author).
131. The letter accompanying the appeals list explains: "Our Deputy Comptroller Offices were
unable to locate any documents showing evidence of any appeals at their level prior to June 2002." Id
In response to a prior FOlA request for the same documents, the OCC advised that "some underlying
documents from the 1990s would have been destroyed through our normal destruction schedules."
Letter from Frank D. Vance, Jr., Manager, Disclosure Service & FOIA Officer, OCC to author (Aug.
21, 2013) (on file with author).
132. Current OCC Ombudsman Larry L. Hattix estimates that 20% of appeals originate with a
Deputy Comptroller. Hattix Interview, supra note 13. There were 58 Ombudsman appeals between
2002 and 2012. See infra Figure 1. The II Deputy Comptroller appeals would be less than 20% of the
total number of appeals during that time.
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Information about bank appeals filed directly with the Ombudsman is
more plentiful and reliable. As previously mentioned, the OCC publishes
summaries of each Ombudsman opinion. Initially the OCC published the
summaries in quarterly journals and annual reports. 133 With the advent of
the Internet, the OCC now posts summaries on its webpage. 134 The
remainder of this section summarizes data I gathered from these
SOUTCCS.135

The OCC's Ombudsman decided 157 appeals between 1994 and 2012.
On average this would amount to about 9 appeals per year, but the number
of appeals per year was not constant during this time period.

133. See, e.g., Appeals Process, 13 OCC Q.J., no. 1, 1993-1994, at 61, 61-66; OCC REPORT OF
THE OMBUDSMAN 1995-1996, at 23-184 (1997).
134. See Bank Appeals Summaries, OCC, http://www.occ.gov/topics/dispute-resolution/bank-

appeals/summaries/index-summaries.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2015). Due to the workload in the
Ombudsman's Oflice, it currently takes about 90 to 120 days after the decision for the summary to
appear on the Internet. Hattix Interview, supranote 13.

135. To provide the OCC Ombudsman appeals data contained in this section, I reviewed and
classified all of the appeals summaries from the OCC annual reports, the OCC Quartelry Journal, and
the OCC Intranet. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (describing these sources).The
printed and Internet sources contained minor discrepancies. When sources conflicted, I relied on the
printed source.
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FIGURE 1: OCC MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS
OMBUDSMAN APPEALS PER YEAR (1994-2012)
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As Figure 1 shows, there were many more appeals during the early
years of the OCC's Ombudsman's Office. Economic conditions' 36 may
partly explain the generally larger number of appeals in the 1990s. These
early appeals may also evidence pent-up demand for an appeals process.
They may also reflect Ombudsman Golden's efforts to market the new
appeals process.1 3 7
Appeals then fell to an historic low of 2 in 2004, before slightly
increasing in recent years. The recent uptick in appeals corresponds with
the financial crisis that began in 2008. Economic downturns may lead to
more appeals either because financial conditions result in harsher MSDs,
or because regulators increase their scrutiny, or both. The overall decline
in appeals over the life of the appeals process could be partly explained by
the significant consolidation in banking between 1994 and 2012. The OCC

136. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
137. Ombudsman Golden explained: "I traveled, the first year, over 200,000 miles making sure
that everyone understood-that no one was fearful of [the appeals] process ..... Golden Interview,
supra note 13. He credited the early number of appeals with this communication strategy. Id.
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regulated 3602 banks at the beginning of 1993.3 By the end of 2012, that
number had dropped to 1783.139 Whatever the reason, there are fewer
appeals now than in the 1990s.
Because the summary decisions were crafted to protect the identity of
the appealing bank and its customers, little information is available about
which banks utilize the appeals process. Many of the appeals give no
indication as to the size or type of bank appealing. Others provide general
information: 29 described the appealing bank as "small" or as a
"community bank"; 10 described the appealing bank as "large"; and 4
described the appealing bank as a "limited-purpose" bank. Ombudsman
Hattix estimates that "maybe two-thirds of the appeals are [brought by]
community banks."l 40 A report prepared by the Department of the
Treasury Office of Inspector General stated that "community banks filed
22 formal appeals from 2007 to 201 1."141
The MSDs at issue vary widely from appeal to appeal. Figure 2
summarizes the issues that generated at least 5 Ombudsman appeals. Many
appeals involved more than one issue. Of the 47 appeals involving the
CAMELS ratings, the composite rating was most often appealed (37
times). The management rating followed closely (32 times). Capital (22),
assets (21), earnings (19), liquidity (14), and sensitivity to market risk (11)
ratings were appealed less often. Again, it was common for a single appeal
to challenge more than one rating. Because the composite and
management ratings are often identified as the more subjective of the
CAMELS ratings, 14 2 it is not surprising that they were appealed more
often.

138. Find Banks, FDIC, https://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp (search with Information as of
Dec. 31, 1992 and Federal Regulator as Comptroller of the Currency) (last visited Feb. 25, 2015)
139. See id. (search with Information as of Dec. 31, 2012 and Federal Regulator as Comptroller of
the Currency).
140.

Hattix Interview, supra note 13.

141. OCC OIG REPORT, supra note 12, at II (this number includes appeals filed with both the
Ombudsman and the appropriate Deputy Comptroller).
142.

See, e.g., Joe Adler, Why Camels Aren't as Secret as You Think, AM. BANKER, Aug. 15,

2011, at I ("[M]ost agree it is impossible to replicate the official ratings exactly, since the regulators
likely include highly subjective information about individual institutions in determining a Camels
score. One crucial element of the rating system is the quality of a bank's management, which is not

necessarily quantifiable."); Kathryn Reed Edge, Anatomy ofa Bank Failure, TENN. B.J., Apr. 2012, at
25 ("The composite is not an average of the other ratings and is sometimes highly subjective.").
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FIGURE 2: OCC MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS APPEALED

TO OMBUDSMAN (1994-2012)
Reason for Appeal

Number

CAMELS Composite or Component Ratings

47

Loan or Asset Classifications

27

Community Reinvestment Act Exam Ratings or Conclusions

24

Issues Related to a Formal or Informal Enforcement Actions

17

Accounting Issues

15

Unprofessional, Abusive, or Retaliatory Examiner Conduct

13

Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses

10

Insider Lending / Regulation 0

10

Consumer Compliance Exam Ratings or Conclusions

9

Designation of the Bank as "Troubled"

8

Lending Limit Rules

8

Determination that Bank Must Amend Its Call Report

6

Truth in Lending Act / Regulation Z

6

Not all of the appeals seeking a change in a CAMELS rating disclosed
the rating the bank had received, but many did. A three-rating was the
most likely to prompt an appeal. Seventy-nine of the CAMELS composite
or component ratings appealed were three-ratings. In comparison, 12 tworatings were appealed, 32 four-ratings were appealed, and 17 five-ratings
were appealed.
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FIGURE 3: OUTCOMES OF OCC MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATION

APPEALS TO OMBUDSMAN (1994-2012)

Banks seldom win appeals. The Ombudsman has upheld 57% (90/157)
of the examiner decisions. In contrast, the appealing bank was the clear
winner in only 20% (31/157) of the appeals. Although the success rate of
appeals has fluctuated from year to year, the generally low number of
appeals makes it impossible to glean any meaningful trends from the
yearly data.
B. FederalReserve
The Federal Reserve System is probably best known as the central
bank of the United States. 143 However, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, along with twelve regional Federal Reserve
Banks (collectively the "Federal Reserve"), supervises and examines
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve. 144 A bank becomes a
member of the Federal Reserve by application and by purchasing stock in

143.
144.

BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 99TH ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 1 (2013).
See id.
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the Federal Reserve Bank in its district. 145 While all nationally chartered
banks must be members of the Federal Reserve, 14 6 the OCC is primarily
responsible for supervising and examining those banks.1 4 7 Thus, the
Federal Reserve focuses its supervisory attention on state-chartered banks
that have chosen to become members of the Federal Reserve. 148 In 2012,
there were 843 state-chartered member banks. 14 9 The Federal Reserve
coordinates examinations of these institutions with state banking
regulators. so

The Federal Reserve also has supervisory authority over bank holding
companies and savings and loan holding companies. 51 In 2012 there were
5088 bank holding companies and 689 savings and loan holding
companies.152 While some of these holding companies are massive and

complex,1 5 3 many are small and engage in little business other than
owning financial institution stock. 15 4 For this reason, the Federal Reserve
does not conduct on-site inspections of all holding companies annually. 15
In 2012, the Federal Reserve conducted 200 on-site inspections of bank
holding companies with less than $1 billion in assets and repeatedly
inspected the largest bank holding companies.1 56 There were 4108 Federal

145. 12 U.S.C. §§ 222, 321 (2012).
146. Id. § 222.
147. See supra Part II.A.
148. See 12 U.S.C. § 325 (2012); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 99TH ANNUAL
REPORT 2013, at 51-52 (2013).

149. See Find Banks, FDIC, https://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp (search with Information as of
Dec. 31, 2012 and Federal Regulator as Federal Reserve Board) (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
150. FEDERAL RESERVE EXAM MANUAL, supra note 36 § 1000.1 ("Under the alternate-year
examination program, those banks that qualify are examined in alternate examination cycles by the

Reserve Bank and the state.").
151.

12 U.S.C.

§§

1844, 1467a (2012). See also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,

99TH ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 51 (2013) ("The Federal Reserve also has responsibility for
supervising the operations of all Edge Act and agreement corporations, the international operations of

state member banks and U.S. [bank holding companies], and the U.S. operations of foreign banking
organizations.").
152. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 99TH ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 56 (2013).
153. For example, the four largest bank holding companies each have total assets exceeding $1

billion. Holding Companies with Assets Greater than $10 Billion, Federal Reserve System National
Information

Center,

http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx,

archived

at

http://perma.cc/2QLD-G5RU (last visited Feb. 26,2015).
154. See FEDERAL RESERVE EXAM MANUAL, supra note 36, § 2060.2 (noting the existence of
"small shell" holding companies that do not have "formal written budgets or [financial] plans").
155. See Div. of Banking Supervision & Regulation, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Supervisory Letter 02-1, Revisions to Bank Holding Company Supervision Procedures for
Organizations with Total Consolidated Assets of $5 Billion or Less (Jan. 9, 2002), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2002/sr020

.htm, archivedat http://perma.cc/484W-

26WA.
156.

(2013).

BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 99TH ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 53 tbl.1
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Reserve employees whose responsibilities focused on supervision and
regulation of financial institutions and the Federal Reserve expected these
ranks to increase.157
1. FederalReserve Appeals Process
Following Congress's passage of the Riegle Community Development
and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, the Federal Reserve Board
issued guidelines for appealing MSDs.' 58 These Board guidelines are still
in effect today and are broad enough to allow appeals by not only statechartered member banks but also bank holding companies and other
entities that are subject to the Federal Reserve's examination or inspection
authority.159 By having agencywide guidelines, the Federal Reserve Board
sought to ensure that all institutions receive "the same appellant rights
regardless of the Federal Reserve district in which they reside."l 60 The
Board guidelines themselves, however, were designed to "allow each
Reserve Bank to administer its own appellate process."'61 The guidelines
seemed to contemplate that each regional Reserve Bank would adopt
additional policies governing appeals of MSDs.1 62 Most have done so, 163

157.

BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., ANNUAL REPORT: BUDGET REVIEW 2013, at

37 tbl.B.3, 42 tbl.C.4 (2013) (noting that there were 383 supervision employees at the Board of
Governors and 3725 supervision employees at the regional Federal Reserve Banks).
158. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,470 (Mar. 30, 1995).
159. Id at 16,473.
160. Id. at 16,472.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 16,473 ("Each Reserve Bank shall make these guidelines and the Reserve Bank's
process for selecting a review panel available to each institution in its district, any institution appealing
a material supervisory determination, and any member of the public who requests them.").
163. FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA, PROCEDURES FOR APPEALS OF MATERIAL SUPERVISORY
DETERMINATIONS (2010), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/banking/sr/FRBATL
Appeals%20_Proc_030210.pdf [hereinafter FRB ATLANTA APPEALS]; FED. RESERVE BANK OF
BOSTON, APPEALS
PROCESS: GUIDELINES FOR APPEALS OF MATERIAL SUPERVISORY
DETERMINATIONS, available at http://www.bostonfed.org/bankinfo/supinfo/appeals-process.htm (last
updated Oct. 15, 2009) [hereinafter FRB BOSTON APPEALS]; FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY,
available at
PROCEDURES FOR APPEALING MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS,
archived at
http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/banking/membership/smb/AppealProcedures.pdf,
http://perma.cc/4JZX-UWXD (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) [hereinafter FRB KANSAS CITY APPEALS];
FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, PROCEDURES FOR APPEALING MATERIAL SUPERVISORY
available at https://www.minneapolisfed.org/-/media/files/banking/
DETERMINATIONS (2014),
srcappealsprocedures02Oll4final.pdf?la=en [hereinafler FRB MINNEAPOLIS APPEALS]; FED. RESERVE
BANK OF NEW YORK, PROCEDURES FOR APPEALS OF ADVERSE MATERIAL SUPERVISORY
DETERMINATIONS, available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/banking/pdflappealsprocedures.pdf,

archived at http://perma.cc/6BUX-HVHV (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) [hereinafter FRB NEW YORK
APPEALS]; FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA, POLICY STATEMENT ON APPEALS OF MATERIAL
SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS (2014) [hereinafter FRB PHILADELPHIA APPEALS], available at

http://www.phil.frb.org/bank-resources/supervision-and-regulation/appeals-policy/AppealPolicy.pdf,
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but my research and FOIA request failed to yield appeals policies for the
Federal Reserve Banks of Cleveland, Chicago, and St. Louis.'6
At the Federal Reserve, financial institutions dissatisfied with an MSD
may file a written appeal with the "Secretary of the Reserve Bank or other
appropriate Reserve Bank official."165 The appeal must be approved by the
institution's board of directors and must "contain all the facts and
arguments that the institution wishes to present."1 6 6 When a Federal
Reserve Bank receives an appeal, it must forward a copy to staff of the
Federal Reserve Board.1 67 The MSD that is the subject of the appeal
remains in effect during the appeals process.1 68
According to the Board guidelines, the initial appeal is considered "by
a person or persons selected by the Reserve Bank . . . who . . . did not

participate in the material supervisory determination[,] do not directly or
indirectly report to the person who made the material supervisory
determination under review[,] and ... are qualified to review the material
supervisory determination." 6 9 Some Reserve Banks' policies specify that
the review panel should consist of at least three individuals who are
appointed by the Federal Reserve Bank Office in Charge of Supervision
and Regulation.1 70 Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke

archived at http://perma.cc/46SM-WD79; FED. RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND, POLICY STATEMENT
ON APPEALS OF MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS (2012), available at http://www.richmond

fed.org/banking/supervision and regulation/pdflpolicystatement on appeals.pdf,

archived

at

http://perma.cc/R669-R65G [hereinafter FRB RICHMOND APPEALS]; FED. RESERVE BANK OF SAN
FRANCISCO, POLICY STATEMENT ON APPEALS OF MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS (2013),

available at http://www.frbsf.org/banking-supervision/regulation/appeals-policy/FRBSF-AppealsPolicy.pdf, archivedat http://perma.cc/9GPZ-BBLU [hereinafter FRB SAN FRANCISCO APPEALS].
164. A 2012 Federal Reserve Office of Inspector General audit of the community bank
examination process "found that all 12 Reserve Banks have established appeals policies that follow
Board guidance." FEDERAL RESERVE OIG REPORT, supra note 12, at 24. To gather such policies, I
made a FOIA request to the Federal Reserve for all "policies currently in effect for handling ...
appeals of material supervisory determinations." See E-mail from author to [Federal Reserve] FOIA

Requests (May 27, 2013) (on file with author). The Federal Reserve's response did not contain policies
from the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, or St. Louis. See E-mail from Denise
Harris, FOIA Office, Federal Reserve Board to author (June 10, 2013) (on file with author). I
telephoned the Federal Reserve's FOIA Office and confirmed that no policies were available for these
Reserve Banks. Telephone call with Denise Harris, FOIA Office, Federal Reserve Board (June 21,
2013). Later I found a copy of the Boston guidelines online. See FRB BOSTON APPEALS, supra note
163.

165. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,470, 16,472 (Mar. 30, 1995).
166. Id
167. Id
168. Id at 16,473.
169. Id at 16,472.
170. See FRB ATLANTA APPEALS, supra note 163, at 2 (providing for a three person review
panel); FRB BOSTON APPEALS, supra note 163 ("A Review Panel, composed of three department
representatives and selected by the SR&C Officer; or three officers/managers from other districts will
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explained that these "review panels" are "selected after consultation with
staff at the [Federal Reserve] Board in Washington." 17 ' The review panels
are often composed of employees from Reserve Banks other than the
Reserve Bank that handled the examination.1 7 2 This process means that the
initial review panels are created on an ad hoc basis and vary in makeup
from appeal to appeal.
An institution submitting an appeal is entitled to appear in person
before the review panel. 7 3 The review panel may choose to allow the
institution to present witnesses.1 74 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York
specifically allows the institution to be represented by counsel and notes
that allowed witnesses might include accountants and other experts. 7' It
also notes that in some instances the review panel may request that
examination staff participate in or present testimony at the hearing.' 6
Most regional Reserve Banks' policies provide for transcribing or
recording the proceedings. 7 7

be established to review the appeal."); FRB PHILADELPHIA APPEALS, supra note 163, § IV.B
(specifying that a review panel consists of three or five individuals); FRB RICHMOND APPEALS, supra
note 163, at IV.B (stating that the reserve panel must contain at least three individuals);. But see FRB
KANSAS CITY APPEALS, supra note 163, at 4 (stating that the size of the panel should be determined

"in light of the nature of the appeal, availability of independent qualified officers and staff, and other
factors deemed relevant by the Appropriate Reserve Bank Official"); FRB MINNEAPOLIS APPEALS,
supra note 163, at 3 (stating that the size of the panel should be determined "in light of the nature of
the appeal, availability of independent qualified officers and staff, and other factors deemed relevant
by the Officer in Charge of Supervision"); FRB NEW YORK APPEALS, supra note 163, § 7(a) (stating
that the review panel must consist of at least one individual); FRB SAN FRANCISCO APPEALS, supra

note 163, at 3 (failing to specify the number of individuals on a review panel).
171. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the Future
of Community Banking Conference: Community Banking (Feb. 16, 2012), available at 2012 WL
523933.
172. FEDERAL RESERVE OIG REPORT, supra note 12, at 22 ("According to Board staff, members
of the independent panel are often selected from other Reserve Banks to ensure their independence.").
See also FRB BOSTON APPEALS, supra note 163 (noting that the panel may consist of "three
officers/managers from other districts"); FRB PHILADELPHIA APPEALS, supra note 163, § IV.B (stating

that the review panel may consist of "officers or senior staff of the [Federal] Reserve Bank [of
Philadelphia]" or "officers or senior staff that are othersize employed by the Federal Reserve
System").
173. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,470, 16,472 (Mar. 30, 1995).
174. Id.
175.

FRB NEW YORK APPEALS, supranote 163,

§ 9(a).

176. Id § 9(c).
177. Some Federal Reserve Banks' policies allow the review panel to determine whether a
transcript or recording is made. FRB ATLANTA APPEALS, supra note 163, at 3; FRB PHILADELPHIA
APPEALS, supra note 163, § V.B.5.d; FRB SAN FRANCISCO APPEALS, supra note 163, at 5. Other
Federal Reserve Banks' policies require a transcript or recording. FRB KANSAS CITY APPEALS, supra
note 163, at 6; FRB RICHMOND APPEALS, supra note 163, § V.B.5.d; FRB NEW YORK APPEALS, supra

note 163, § 9(d); FRB MINNEAPOLIS APPEALS, supra note 163, § 6(d).
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As an initial matter, the review panel must decide whether the
institution's complaint falls within the scope of appealable MSDs.178 The
Federal Reserve Board guidelines state that "[t]he term 'material
supervisory determination' includes, but is not limited to, material
determinations relating to examination or inspection composite ratings, the
adequacy of loan loss reserves and significant loan classifications." 1 79 The
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco's policy adds that an appeal "may
cover any type of examination, including safety and soundness, trust,
transfer agent, electronic data processing, consumer compliance, and
CRA." 8 o Institutions may not use the MSD appeals process to challenge
prompt corrective action directives, enforcement actions, or capital
directives.181 If the review panel concludes that the matter is not subject to
appeal, the institution can appeal that decision in the same way it could
appeal a decision on the merits of the appeal.1 82
If the review panel concludes the matter is appealable, it then turns its
attention to the merits of the appeal. The Board guidelines provide no
guidance on the standards the review panel should use in evaluating the
appeal.' 83 Regional Reserve Banks have filled this void with conflicting
policies. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York allows the most robust
review, stating that "[t]he Review Panel will use a 'de novo' standard of
review in reaching its decision."' 8 4 On the other hand, the Federal Reserve
of Kansas City states that the review panel has the power to determine the
standard of review.185 "Generally, the standard of review will focus on
whether the Reserve Bank's findings and conclusions are based on
sufficient evidence and are consistent with [Federal Reserve System]
policy."' 8 6 The Kansas City Reserve Bank's policies explicitly state that
"[i]n most cases, a de novo review will not be undertaken."' 8 7 Until 2014,
the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis used a standard of review
identical to the Kansas City standard.188 However, the Minneapolis

178. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,470, 16,473 (Mar. 30, 1995).
179. Id.
180.

FRB SAN FRANCISCO APPEALS, supra note 163, at 2.

181.
182.
183.
184.

Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,470, 16,473 (Mar. 30, 1995).
Id
Id
FRB NEW YORK APPEALS, supranote 163, § 10(a).

185. FRB KANSAS CITY APPEALS, supra note 163, at 6 ("The Appeal Panel will then determine
such administrative items as its standard for review.").
186. FRB KANSAS CITY APPEALS, supranote 163, at 6.

187. Id.
188. Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Procedures for Appealing Material Supervisory
Determinations 7 (2004).
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Reserve Bank amended its policy to provide: "The standard for review
will be whether the Reserve Bank's findings and conclusions were based
on sufficient evidence and were consistent with FRS policy."189 The
Minneapolis policy emphasizes that "[a] completely new (de novo) review
will not be undertaken."' 90 The remaining regional Reserve Bank's
policies do not directly address the standard of review. 191 Given this lack
of clarity, it seems the standard of review employed can vary widely
depending on the location of the institution, the makeup of the review
panel, and other unexplained factors deemed important by the review
panel.
Once the review panel reaches a conclusion, it must prepare a written
decision. 192 The decision should summarize the factual and legal basis for
the panel's conclusions.' 9 3 The review panel sends the written decision to
the institution.1 94 Regional Reserve Bank policies also require that the
decision be sent to Federal Reserve staff members who oversee the
institution's examinations or inspections, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve, and any relevant state regulators. 9 5 Ordinarily, the
review panel should reach a decision "within 30 calendar days of the filing
of an informationally complete appeal." 96
The institution, with the consent of its board of directors, may appeal
the review panel's decision to the regional Reserve Bank President. 197 As
with the initial appeal, this secondary appeal should contain "all facts and
arguments that the institution wishes to be considered."' 98 The Board

189.

FRB MINNEAPOLIS APPEALS, supra note 163, at 4.

190. Id.
191. The policies of the Federal Reserve Banks of Philadelphia and Richmond state that the
written decision should "set forth the basis for the Review Panel's conclusions, including the scope of
the review." FRB PHILADELPHIA APPEALS, supra note 163, at 8; FRB RICHMOND APPEALS, supra
note 163, § V.C.I.
192. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,470, 16,472 (Mar. 30, 1995).
193. See, e.g., FRB KANSAS CITY APPEALS, supra note 163, at 7 ("The written decision will
include a memorandum outlining the basis for the Appeal Panel's conclusions, including appropriate
citations of legal authority or [Federal Reserve System] policies and documentation provided by the
Appellant or the Reserve Bank.").
194. See, e.g., FRB PHILADELPHIA APPEALS, supra note 163, § V.C.2.
195. See, e.g., FRB ATLANTA APPEALS, supra note 163, at 3.
196. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,472. Federal Reserve Bank
policies generally provide that an appeal is not considered "informationally complete" until any
requested hearing has been held. See, e.g., FRB RICHMOND APPEALS, supra note 163, § V.B.3.
197. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,472. The Federal Reserve
Bank of New York's policy provides that the second level of appeal may be heard by the Federal
Reserve Bank "President or his or her appointed delegate (e.g., the [Federal Reserve Bank's]
Management Committee)." FRB NEW YORK APPEALS, supra note 163, § 11(a).
198. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,472.
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guidelines provide little guidance on this stage other than to note that the
President should issue a written decision to the institution within "30
calendar days of the filing of an informationally complete appeal."l 99
Regional Reserve Bank policies on this second level of appeal are scant
and varied. Some policies focus on the mechanics of the review. For
example, some policies provide that the Reserve Bank President should
obtain a record of the initial appeal and should allow supervisory staff an
opportunity to respond to any new claims raised by the institution.2 00 Only
the Federal Reserve Banks of Kansas City and Minneapolis attempt to
address the standard of review, and they provide the Federal Reserve Bank
President with complete discretion to determine the standard and scope of
201
the review.
If the financial institution is still dissatisfied, it can appeal "to the
appropriate [Federal Reserve Board] Governor by filing a written appeal
with the Secretary of the Board." 20 2 Currently, Federal Reserve Governor
Daniel K. Tarullo is tasked with handling such appeals. 203 The Governor is
instructed to "consult with the director of the appropriate division of the
Board of Governors" and reach a written decision "within 60 calendar
days of the filing of an informationally complete appeal."2 204 The Board
guidelines do not discuss the standard of review the Governor should use
in deciding the appeal.205
The Board guidelines require that each regional Reserve Bank adopt
"safeguards to protect appellants from retaliation."206 Most policies state
that Federal Reserve staff who retaliate against institutions will be
disciplined.207 Four Reserve Banks prevent examination staff who

199. Id.
200. FRB PHILADELPHIA APPEALS, supra note 163, at 9; FRB RICHMOND APPEALS, supra note
163, § Vl.C.2; FRB MINNEAPOLIS APPEALS, supra note 163, at 6.

201. FRB KANSAS CITY APPEALS, supra note 163, at 8 ("The President Specific standards for
review are not set, but rather the President may base his/her decision on whatever facts and
information the President deems relevant under the circumstances."; FRB MINNEAPOLIS APPEALS,

supra note 163, at 6 ("There is no specific standard of review; rather, the President may base his/her
decision on whatever facts and information the President deems relevant under the circumstances.").

202. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,473.
203. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Speech at the
Future of Community Banking Conference: Community Banking (Feb. 16, 2012), available at 2012
WL 523933.
204. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,473.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See, e.g., FRB RICHMOND APPEALS, supra note 163,

§ VIlI.B.
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participated in the appealed decisions from participating in the institution's
next exam and allow for longer exclusions on a case-by-case basis.208
The Board guidelines also assign the Federal Reserve's Ombudsman a
role in discouraging retaliatory behavior by examiners. The Ombudsman
must contact appealing institutions twice-once "six months after an
appeal as been decided" and once "six months after the date of the next
examination" to ask whether the institution has been subject to
retaliation. 20 9 Institutions can contact the Ombudsman with a complaint of
retaliation at any time.210
2. FederalReserve Appeals
The Federal Reserve does not publicly release appeals decisions in any
form. My FOIA requests for appeals decisions since 1994 yielded a table
summarizing each appeal filed between 2001 and 2012.211 For each
appeal, the Federal Reserve provided the date of the initial appeal, the
reason for the appeal, the level of the appeal, and a summary of the
outcome of the appeal. Because the Federal Reserve did not provide any of
the underlying appeals decisions, it is impossible for me to confirm its
characterization of the reason for and outcome of each appeal. Thus, the
remander of this section reports FOIA-gathered data as characterized by
the Federal Reserve.2 12

208. See FRB ATLANTA APPEALS, supra note 163, at 4; FRB PHILADELPHIA APPEALS, supra note
163, at 10; FRB RICHMOND APPEALS, supra note 163, at VIll.A; FRB SAN FRANCISCO APPEALS,

supra note 163, at 7. Other Reserve Banks' policies specify that protections are crafted based on the
circumstances of the case by the review panel or other Reserve Bank officials. FRB KANSAS CITY
APPEALS, supra note 163, at 9-10; FRB NEW YORK APPEALS, supra note 163, § 12(b).
209. Ombudsman Policy Statement, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/ombpolicy.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/6ZW4-VPR4

(last updated Feb. 20, 2014). See also Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. at
16,473 ("The Board's Ombudsman will periodically contact institutions after their appeals have been
decided in order to make certain that no retaliation has occurred.").
210. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,473.
211. Letter from Margaret McCloskey Shanks, Assoc. Sec'y of the Bd., Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., to author (Aug. 20, 2012) (on file with author).
212. Id
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FIGURE 4: FEDERAL RESERVE MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS
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Between 2001 and 2012, the Federal Reserve received 25 appeals of
MSDs. As with the OCC, there was an increase in the number of appeals
corresponding with the 2008 financial crisis.213
The vast majority of appeals were resolved at the initial review panel
stage. Of the 25 appeals, only 6 pursued an additional appeal to the
regional Reserve Bank President, and only 4 of those filed an appeal with
the Federal Reserve Board Governor tasked with resolving appeals. The
Federal Reserve did not indicate which regional Reserve Bank handled
each appeal.
Little is known about the entities bringing these appeals. In one
instance, the reason for the appeal and the outcome suggest the appellant
was a bank holding company,2 14 but in all other instances there is no
description of the appealing institution.

213. It is also possible that information on appeals, particularly from the earlier years is
incomplete.
214. The Federal Reserve listed the reason for the appeal as "[c]omposite/component BHC rating
based on OCC subsidiary bank composite/component ratings and violations of law." Letter from

2015]

1137

WHEN BANK EXAMINERS GET IT WRONG

As with the OCC, Federal Reserve appeals most frequently involved
CAMELS composite or component ratings. Figure 5 details issues raised
by at least 2 appeals.
FIGURE 5: FEDERAL RESERVE MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS

APPEALED (2001-2012)
Reason for Appeal

Number

CAMELS Composite or Component Ratings

16

Loan or Asset Classifications

7

Capital Calculations

2

Limitation or Restriction of Dividend Payments

2

Issues Related to a Formal or Informal Enforcement Actions

2

Of the 16 appeals involving CAMELS composite or component
ratings, 12 specify "[c]omposite/component ratings" as the reason for the
215
Two appeals involved the management component rating. One
appeal.
appeal involved the asset quality component rating. And I appeal involved
a composite rating. The Federal Reserve did not provide any data about
the actual rating (1-5) that the appealing entity received.
The Federal Reserve's appeals process rarely overturns MSDs. As
shown in Figure 5, the process upheld the examiner determination 68%
(17/25) of the time. Only 2 appeals (8%) reversed the examiner
determination. Three appeals (12%) ultimatedly resulted in mixed
decisions. Two appeals (8%) were withdrawn before any level of the
appeals had reached a decision. Finally, in 1 appeal the review panel
determined that the matter appealed was not a material supervisory
determination.216

Margaret McCloskey Shanks, Assoc. Sec'y of the Bd., Bd. of Governors of the Fed.l Reserve Sys., to
author (Aug. 20, 2012) (on file with author).
215. Id
216. This appeal is show in the "Other" category in Figure 5.
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FIGURE 6: OUTCOMES OF FEDERAL RESERVE MATERIAL SUPERVISORY

DETERMINATION APPEALS (2001-20 12)

Appeals were most successful at the review panel level. The review
panel upheld 18 cases, reversed 2 cases, and issued mixed decisions in 2
cases. Appeals escalated to the regional Reserve Bank President were
never successful; all 6 president-level decisions upheld the examination
determinations. Of the 4 appeals that were ultimately brought to a Federal
Reserve Board Governor, 2 upheld the MSD, I was withdrawn before the
Governor issued an opinion,217 and 1 resulted in a mixed decision. Because
the Federal Reserve did not provide any underlying information about any
of the appeals, it is impossible to assess whether the Federal Reserve has
been consistent in its decision-making.

217. Because both the review committee and the President upheld this examiner decision, I
categorized it as an appeal that upheld the examiner decision for the purpose of Figure 5. Only appeals
that were withdrawn before any appeals process decision were included in the "Withdrawn" category
for Figure 5.
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C. FDIC
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insures bank deposits.2 18
Although the FDIC provides insurance for banks regulated by the OCC
and Federal Reserve, the FDIC does not serve as the primary regulator for
those banks. 2 19 The FDIC is the primary federal regulator only for statechartered banks and thrifts that are not members of the Federal Reserve
System. 2 20 Because non-member state banks are also regulated by state
authorities, the FDIC "and state regulators coordinate their supervisory
programs and, in many instances, alternate examinations or conduct joint
examinations." 221 In 2012, the FDIC served as the primary federal
regulator for 4466 banks.222 More than 90% of those banks have assets of
less than $1 billion. 2 23 The FDIC had 7476 full-time equivalent
employees.224
1. FDIC Appeals Process
Before Congress mandated that federal regulators provide an
independent intra-agency review process for MSDs, the FDIC had an
informal policy of reviewing "examination findings and similar decisions
during the examination process." 22 5 Under that policy, banks could address
a written request for "supplementary review" to the Division of
Supervision Director in Washington, D.C.226 The Director would then
"make a good faith effort to evaluate and resolve the issues raised."2 2 7

218. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811, 1814-15 (2012).
219. See supra Parts II.A, II.B (describing the examination authority of the OCC and Federal
Reserve); 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b)(3) (giving the FDIC examination authority over all insured banks);
CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 27, at 632 (describing the examination conventions

employed by federal regulators).
220. FDIC OIG REPORT, supranote 12, at 2.
221. Id.
222. See Find Banks, FDIC, https://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp (search with Information as of
Dec. 31, 2012 and Federal Regulator as FDIC) (last visited Feb. 25, 2015); Statistics on Depository
Institutions, FDIC, http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
223. See Find Banks, FDIC, https://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp (search with Information as of
Dec. 31, 2012, Size or Preformance as Total Assets ($) Equal or Less than $1,000,000,000, and
Federal Regulator as FDIC) (listing 4152 state-chartered non-member banks with less than $1 billion
in assets).

224.
225.
(Feb. 7,
226.
227.

FDIC, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 133 (2013).
FDIC, Fin. Inst. Letter 11-92, Procedures for Requesting Review of Supervisory Decisions
1992), available at 1992 WL 714970.
Id
Id.
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In response to the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1994, the FDIC Board of Directors adopted new,
more formal guidelines.228 The FDIC has amended these guidelines on
four occasions, adjusting the scope of appealable matters, the composition
of the appellate review committee, and the process for handling appeals. 22 9
As currently written, the FDIC guidelines encourage, but do not
require, banks to make "a good-faith effort to resolve any dispute
concerning a material supervisory determination with the on-site examiner
and/or the appropriate Regional Office." 2 30 If the bank is still unhappy
with an MSD, the bank may request that the Division or Office Director
overseeing the examination conduct a formal review.23 The request for
review must include a description of the issues with citations to relevant
legal authority. 232 The request for review must also indicate that the bank's
board of directors has authorized the review.233

228. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appellate Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,923 (Mar. 28, 1995).
229. See FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,479, 41,480 (July 9, 2004)
(reducing the Supervisory Appellate Review Committee from five to three members and adjusting the
process for triggering review by that Committee); FDIC, Guidelines for Appeals of Material
Supervisory Determinations, 73 Fed. Reg. 54,822 (Sept. 23, 2008) ("eliminat[ing] the ability of an
FDIC-supervised institution to file an appeal with the [Supervisory Review Committee] with respect to

determinations or the facts and circumstances underlying a recommended or pending formal
enforcement-related action or decision"); FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 75 Fed. Reg. 20,358,
20,359 (Apr. 19, 2010) (extending various deadlines for FDIC decisions on appeals); FDIC, IntraAgency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,055, 17,056 (Mar. 23, 2012) (making changes to reflect
organizational adjustments necessitated in part by the elimination of the Office of Thrift Supervision).
The 2004 process changes suggest that the FDIC also amended the policy in 1999. See FDIC, IntraAgency Appeal Process, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,479, 41,480 (July 9, 2004) ("The 1995 SARC guidelines
were amended in 1999 . . . to provide formally that the Directors of DOS and DCA (now the DSC
Director) would not vote on cases brought before the SARC involving their respective (now
consolidated) divisions. . . ."). However, when I made a FOIA request for documents related to a 1999
change, the FDIC responded that it had no responsive documents, explaining that "the FDIC did not
publish a 1999 edition of the Guidelines for Appeals of Material Supervisory Determinations." Letter
from Jim Braun, Senior FOIA Specialist, FOIA/Privacy Act Group, FDIC, to author (July 9, 2013) (on
file with author).
230. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. at 17,057.
231. Id (specifying that appeals should be made to "either the Director, [Division of Depositor
and Consumer Protection], Director, [Division of Risk Management Supervision], or Director, [Office

of Complex Financial Institutions]"). The Division of Risk Management Supervision has responsibility
for safety and soundness examinations as well as trust operations, information technology controls,
and Bank Secrecy Act compliance. FDIC OIG REPORT, supra note 12, at 3.The Division of Depositor
and Consumer Protection conducts examinations to assess compliance

with the Community

Reinvestment Act and consumer protection laws. Id. The Office of Complex Financial Institutions is
tasked with overseeing the supervisory, insurance, and resolution risks presented to the FDIC by large

and complex financial institutions. Id. at 3-4.
232. See FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. at 17,057 (additionally requiring a
description of "how resolution of the dispute would materially affect the institution, and whether a
good-faith effort was made to resolve the dispute with the on-site examiner and the Regional Office").
233. Id.
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The FDIC's guidelines do not specify how the Division or Office
Director should go about deciding the appeal. To fill this void, in 2004 the
Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection (now known as the
Division of Depositor and Consumer Protection) adopted its own policy
for handling its appeals.234 There the Director appoints a three person
committee to prepare "a memorandum that summarizes the institution's
position, the Regional Office's position, and if applicable, the State
banking authority's position, as well as the basis for the Panel's
recommendation regarding each material supervisory determination."23 5
After reviewing this information, the Director makes his or her own
assessment.2 36 In any event, the Division or Office Director will issue a
written decision within forty-five days of receipt of the request. 2 37
If the bank is still not satisfied, it may appeal to the FDIC's
Supervision Appeals Review Committee. The Committee consists of three
voting members, including one FDIC inside board member and one deputy
or special assistant to a board member. 2 38 "The [FDIC's] General Counsel
is a non-voting member of the [Committee]." 239 The current Supervision
Appeals Review Committee consists of FDIC Vice Chairman Thomas E.
Hoenig, Deputy to the Chairman Kymberly Copa, and Deputy to the
Director Marianne Hatheway. 240 FDIC Acting General Counsel Richard
241
Osterman serves as a nonvoting member of the Committee.
The bank must provide the Committee with contact information for the
bank, the Division or Office Director's determination, and an explanation
of "all of the reasons, legal and factual, why it disagrees with the Division
or Office Director's determination." 2 42 The bank is generally prohibited
from raising arguments or providing evidence that was not considered by

234. Div. of Supervision & Consumer Prot., FDIC, Guidelines for Processing Requests for
Review of Material Supervisory Determinations (2004), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/sarc/

dscguidelines.html, archived at https://perma.cc/CUP4-2RKG [hereinafter FDIC DSC Guidelines].
Although the name of the division has changed and the FDIC's appeals guidelines have been updated
since 2004, see supra note 229, it does not appear that the Division has updated its process guidelines.
235. FDIC DSC GUIDELINES, supra note 234. If the subject matter of the appeal was the "joint

product" of the FDIC and a state regulator, the FDIC must notify the state regulator of the appeal and
provide that regulator with an opportunity to comment on it. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77
Fed. Reg. at 17,058.
236.

237.
238.
239.
240.
(July 15,
241.
242.

FDIC DSC GUIDELINES, supranote 234.

FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. at 17,057.
Id. at 17,056.
Id.
Letter from Jim Braun, Senior FOIA Specialist, FOIA/Privacy Act Group, FDIC, to author
2013) (on file with author).
Id.
FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. at 17,058.
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the Division or Office Director.243 The Committee will not consider
changes in facts or circumstances that arose after the completion of the
examination.244 The appealing bank is not entitled to "discovery or other
such rights."24 5
The FDIC guidelines contain a list of appealable items that includes
CAMELS ratings, determinations concerning the adequacy of loan loss
reserves, and "[c]lassifications of loans and other assets in dispute the
amount of which, individually or in the aggregate, exceeds 10 percent of
an institution's total capital." 2 46 The guidelines specify that banks may not
appeal "[fjormal enforcement-related actions and decisions, including
determinations and the underlying facts and circumstances that form the
basis of a recommended or pending formal enforcement action, and FDIC
determinations regarding compliance with an existing formal enforcement
action."247
At the FDIC, the appeals process itself is not a trial-like review of the
MSD. An appealing bank may request that it be allowed to make an oral
presentation,248 but the Committee need not grant the request. The
guidelines specify that oral presentation should only be granted if it "is
likely to be helpful or would otherwise be in the public interest." 2 49
According to Sandra L. Thompson, Director of the FDIC's Division of
Risk Management Supervision, institutions' requests for oral presentation
are "normally granted." 25 0 If the Committee allows an oral presentation,
the Committee can question the institution and require that FDIC staff
participate in the proceeding. 251 The Committee "review[s] the appeal for
consistency with the policies, practices, and mission of the FDIC and the
overall reasonableness of, and the support offered for, the positions

243. See id. ("Evidence not presented for review to the Division or Office Director may be
submitted to the [Committee] only if authorized by the [Committee] Chairperson.").
244. Id
245. Id.
246. Id. at 17,057. Banks may also appeal IT ratings, CRA ratings, consumer compliance ratings,
trust ratings, securities dealer examination ratings, findings of statutory or regulatory violations, Truth

in Lending Act restitution, and "[a]ny other supervisory determination . . . that may affect the capital,
earnings, operating flexibility, or capital category for prompt corrective action purposes of an
institution, or otherwise affect the nature and level of supervisory oversight accorded an institution."

Id
247.
248.
249.
250.
Director,
251.

Id.
Id. at 17,058.
Id
Hearing on H.R. 3461, supra note 5, at 145 (written testimony of Sandra L. Thompson,
FDIC Division of Risk Management Supervision).
FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. at 17,058.

2015]

WHEN BANK EXAMINERS GET IT WRONG

1143

advanced." 2 52 The bank bears the "burden of proof as to all matters at issue
in the appeal."253
Regardless of whether there is a hearing, the Committee must convene
to discuss the appeal within ninety days of the time the bank's request for
review was filed. Once the Committee has met, it has forty-five days to
prepare a written decision and provide it to the appealing bank.254 The
Committee then publishes the decision online, redacting it to omit
confidential information about the bank or the bank's customers. 2 5 5 a
cases in which redaction is deemed insufficient to prevent improper
disclosure, published decisions [are] presented in summary form." 2 56
The FDIC's guidelines prohibit examiners from retaliating against
banks that use the appeals process. Retaliation "constitutes unprofessional
conduct and will subject the examiner or other personnel to appropriate
disciplinary or remedial action." 2 5 7 The process for handling allegations of
retaliation is less clear. Banks are first "encouraged to contact the Regional
Director," but later the guidelines provide that institutions may file
complaints of retaliation with the FDIC Ombudsman.2 58 If a bank
complains of retaliation to the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman is instructed
to "work with the appropriate Division or Office Director to resolve the
allegation of retaliation."259
2. FDICAppeals
At the FDIC appeals must first be addressed to a Division Director. 26 0
The Director's decision can then be appealed to the Supervision Appeals
Review Committee. 2 6 1 The FDIC does not publicly release Director-stage
decisions. I requested those decisions through FOIA. The FDIC eventually

252.
253.
254.
255.
appeals,

Id
Id.
Id.
See id. (noting that the appeals decisions can be cited as precedent). For a listing of these
see Supervision Appeals Review

Committee-Decisions, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/

regulations/laws/sarc/sarcappeals.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ZNA5-PUEV (last updated Apr.
16, 2014).
256. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. at 17,058. See, e.g., Material Supervisory
Determination Decision of May 2, 2008, SARC-2007-04 (FDIC May 2, 2008), available at
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/sar/sarcappeals/sarc2007O4.html,

NP6C-9KS6.
257. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. at 17,059.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260.

See supranote 231 and accompanying text.

261.

See supranotes 238-41 and accompanying text.

archived at https://perma.cc/
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provided a summary table listing the type of determination, the date the
Director appeal was received, the action taken by the Director, the date of
any appeal to the Committee, and the Committee's decision.262
It appears that some of the FOIA gathered data is incompleteparticularly for appeals filed before 2005. The FOIA data list only 6 pre2005 Committee appeals. In contrast, the FDIC's webpage contains 46
pre-2005 Committee decisions.263 Because each appeal had to first be
addressed to the appropriate Director, some Director appeals are missing
from the FOIA data.26
The FOIA-provided Director-level data from 2005 onward seem more
complete. 265 The FOIA data identifies 56 appeals filed between 2005 and
2012. Figure 7 shows the number of director-level appeals by year during
this time period. Of those, 25 generated appeals to the Committee.

262. Initially, the FDIC denied my request asserting the information was protected bank
examination material under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8). Letter from Jim Braun, Senior FOIA Specialist,
FOlA/Privacy Act Group, FDIC, to author (June 18, 2013) (on file with author). I appealed the denial
to the FDIC's General Counsel. Letter from author to Richard J. Osterman, Jr., Acting Gen. Counsel,
FDIC (June 19, 2013) (on file with author). The FDIC then agreed to provide the summary
information. Letter from Barbara Sarshik, Senior Counsel, FDIC, to author (July 30, 2013) (on file
with author). The initial table provided by the FDIC omitted Committee information for some appeals.
Id. A further FOIA request yielded the missing information. Letter from Jim Braun, Senior FOIA
Specialist, FOlA/Privacy Act Group, FDIC, to author (Oct. 10, 2013) (on file with author).
263. Appeals to the Supervision Appeals Review Committee are summarized in Figure 8.
264. Record making and keeping during the pre-2005 time period may have been lacking. Cf
FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,479, 41,481 (July 9, 2004) (noting a financial
institution's complaint that it had never been "informed of [the Director's] denial of its request for
review or that the request has been passed to the SARC").
265.

In three instances, I still could not reconcile the FOIA data with the FDIC's Supervision

Appeals Review Committee decisions webpage. One webpage Committee decision did not appear on
the FOIA list. Material Suprevisory Determination Decision of Sept. 7, 2010, SARC-2010-04 (FDIC
Sept. 7, 2010), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/sarc/sarcappeals/sarc20l004.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/ZNA5-PUEV (appeal of rate restrictions under 12 C.F.R. § 337.6). Two
Committee appeals on the FOIA list did not appear as decisions on the FDIC's webpage. One was a
March 24, 2005 appeal of a "[c]omposite rating; capital, management, earning, and liquidity
component ratings" that was reportedly denied by the Committee. Letter from Jim Braun, Senior FOIA
Specialist, FOIA/Privacy Act Group, FDIC, to author (Oct. 10, 2013) (on file with author). The other
was a February 1, 2005 appeal of a "[c]onsumer compliance rating" that was reportedly denied by the
Committee. Id.
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FIGURE 7: FDIC MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATION APPEALS

FILED WITH A DIVISION DIRECTOR (2005-2012)
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In comparison, information about appeals decided by the Supervision
Appeals Review Committee is more available and more complete. The
FDIC has published online redacted or summary versions of every
decision issued by its Supervision Appeals Review Committee since
1995.266 . reviewed and classified each of these decisions.
The Committee issued 63 decisions between 1995 and 2012. As shown
in Figure 8, the Committee handled more appeals during its early years of
operations. As with the OCC, the early number of appeals might be partly
attributable to economic conditions and pent-up demand for an appeals
process. At the FDIC, there is another likely reason: until 2004, any
Division Director who decided an appeal against a bank was required to
forward the appeal to the Supervision Appeals Review Committee for
review. 2 67 In 2004, the FDIC amended its process to allow the appealing

266.

Supervision Appeals Review Committee-Decisions, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/

laws/sarc/sarcappeals.html, archivedathttp://pertna.cc/ZNA5-PUEV (last updated Apr. 16, 2014).
267. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appellate Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,923, 15,930 (Mar. 28, 1995).
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bank to determine whether it wanted to pursue the additional appeal to the
Committee. 2 68 This change may have resulted in fewer appeals sent to the
Committee after 2004.
FIGURE 8: FDIC SUPERVISION APPEALS REVIEW COMMITTEE DECISIONS

PER YEAR (1995-2012)
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As with the OCC and Federal Reserve, complaints about CAMELS
composite or component ratings generated the most appeals (35).
Community Reinvestment Act examination ratings also generated a
significant number of appeals (19). Figure 9 summarizes issues raised by
at least 2 appeals from 2005 through 2012.
Of the appeals between 2005 and 2012 involving CAMELS ratings, the
management rating was most commonly appealed (22 times), followed
closely by the composite rating (19). Earnings (15), capital (14), and asset
(12) ratings were also frequently appealed. Liquidity (6) and sensitivity to
market risk (7) were appealed less frequently.

268. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,481.
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FIGURE 9: FDIC MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS APPEALED

(2005-2012)269
Reason for Appeal

Number

CAMELS Composite or Component Ratings

35

Community Reinvestment Act Rating

19

Loan or Asset Classifications

13

Consumer Compliance Exam Rating or Conclusions

12

Fair Housing Act / Equal Credit Opportunity Act Findings or Violations

7

Capital Calculations or Classification and Resulting Restrictions

6

Issues Related to a Formal or Informal Enforcement Actions

6

Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses

3

Accounting Issues

3

Insider Lending / Regulation0

3

Designation of the Bank as "Troubled"

2

Determination that Bank Must Amend Its Call Report

2

Data on the numerical ratings appealed are only available for those
appeals handled by the Supervision Appeals Review Committee. 270 During
the 2005 to 2012 time period, appeals of a three-rating were most likely to
be heard by the Committee: 47 three-ratings were appealed. In
comparison, 23 two-ratings were appealed, 16 four-ratings were appealed,
and 5 five-ratings were appealed. When compared with OCC-regulated
banks, FDIC-regulated banks appear more likely to appeal a two-rating.

269. Data for this figure were compiled from the FOIA-provided summary of Director-level
appeals. Letter from Jim Braun, Senior FOIA Specialist, FOlA/Privacy Act Group, FDIC, to author
(Oct. 10, 2013) (on file with author). As such, it contains the issues as characterized by the FDIC. I
attempted to reconcile the FOlA information with the Supervision Appeals Review Committee
Decisions. See Supervision Appeals Review Committee-Decisions, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/sarc/sarcappeals.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ZNA5-PUEV (last updated Apr.
16, 2014). In cases where the Director decision was appealed to the Committee, the FDIC's
description of the issued appealed was generally accurate.
270. I collected the data reporte in this paragraph from the FDIC web page. See Supervision
Appeals Review Committee-Decisions,supra note 269.
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FIGURE 10: OUTCOMES OF FDIC MATERIAL SUPERVISORY
DETERMINATION APPEALS (2005-2012)271

When banks appeal MSDs using the FDIC's process, they rarely win.
Between 2005 and 2012,272 only 2 decisions were entirely in favor of the

271. Data for this figure were compiled from both the data received through FOIA and the
publicly available appeals decisions. See Letter from Jim Braun, Senior FOIA Specialist,

FOIA/Privacy Act Group, FDIC, to author (Oct. 10, 2013) (on file with author); Supervision Appeals
Review Committee-Decisions, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/sarc/sarcappeals.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/ZNA5-PUEV (last updated Apr. 16, 2014). Figure 10 shows the ultimate
outcome whether reached at the Director level or at the Supervision Appeals Review Committee
Level. For this reason, it contains data on 2 more appeals than the data in Figures 8 and 9. See supra
note 265 (describing minor data inconsistencies). For those curious about just those appeals before the
Supervision Appeals Review Committee (1995-2012): 58 upheld the examiner determination, 4
reversed the examiner determination, and I was a mixed decision.
272. It is unclear whether this same pattern holds for pre-2005 appeals. Of the Supervision
Appeals Review Committee decisions issued before 2005, 39 upheld the examiner determination, 4
reversed the examiner determination, and 4 were mixed decisions. On the other hand, the likely
incomplete FOIA list of appeals, see supra note 264 and accompanying text, show 5 appeals upholding
the examiner, 8 reversing the examiner, 6 mixed decisions, and 2 withdrawn appeals.

2015]

1149

WHEN BANK EXAMINERS GET IT WRONG

bank 273 and 3 were decided partially in favor of the bank.274 This means
that the appealing bank had a favorable result in less than 10% of appeals
(5/58). In contrast, the process fuilly upheld the examiner 60% (35/58) of
the time. Of the 11 appeals falling in the "other" category, the Director or
Committee determined that 7 were ineligible for review and returned them
without a written decision.
D. NCUA
The National Credit Union Administration supervises federallychartered credit unionS276 as well as federally insured state-chartered credit
unions.277 Credit unions are distinct from the financial institutions
previously discussed because they are owned by their "members" (rather
than investors),278 have limited authority to engage in commercial
lending, 279 and pay fewer taxes. 2 80 Credit unions are, on average, smaller
than banks.2 8 1 Notwithstanding these differences, the NCUA evaluates
credit unions using the CAMEL rating system282 and, like the other federal
regulators, must provide an "independent intra-agency appellate process
... to review material supervisory determinations." 2 8 3 As of the end of
2012, the NCUA supervised 4272 federal credit unions and 2547 federally

273. In one of those cases, the regional office reconsidered and upgraded the appealed
management rating before the Director decided the appeal. The other bank win was issued at the
Director-level.
274. One mixed decision was issued at the Director-level. The other 2 were issued by the
Supervision Appeals Review Committee.
275. The outcomes of 3 appeals were categorized as "other" because the bank was closed or its
deposit insurance was terminated. The final "other" appeal was "Returned/PCA notice rescinded."
276. 12 U.S.C. § 1756 (2012).
277. Id. §§ 1782, 1784. Credit union deposits can be insured by the National Credit Union Share
Insurance Fund, an insurance fund operated by the federal government that is similar to the FDIC's
insurance fund for banks. Id. § 1783. Both federally-chartered and state-chartered credit unions are

eligible for this federal insurance, and most elect its coverage. See id

§

1781(a); The State of the

Credit Union Industry: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & UrbanAffairs, I 11th Cong.

15 (2010) (written statement of Deborah Matz, Chairman, NCUA).
278. 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (2012) (describing membership in federal credit unions); id.

§

1752(6)

(describing "State-chartered credit union" as "a credit union organized and operated according to the

laws of any State, the District of Columbia, the several territories and possessions of the United States,
the Panama Canal Zone, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, which laws provide for the
organization of credit unions similar in principle and objectives to Federal credit unions").
279. Id. § 1757(a).
280. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(14)(A) (2012) (providing that credit unions, as non-profit, mutual
organizations, are exempt from federal income tax).
281. TIMOTHY W. KoCH & S. Scorr MACDONALD, BANK MANAGEMENT 40-41 (7th ed. 2010).
282. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.

283.

12 U.S.C. § 4806(a) (2012).
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insured state-chartered credit unions.28 4 It has 1191 full-time equivalent
285
employees.
1. NCUA Appeals Process

'

The NCUA adopted its process for reviewing MSDs in 1995 following
the Congressional mandate.28 6 Although the NCUA has made minor
changes to the scope of appealable matters, the structure of its appeals
process has remained largely unchanged.287
Like other regulators, the NCUA prefers to address credit unions'
complaints informally.288 However, when such avenues prove ineffective,
the NCUA's MSD appeals process is open to both federally-chartered
credit unions and federally insured state-chartered credit unions.289 Statechartered credit unions can only appeal those determinations that were
made by an NCUA examiner.290 If a state examiner made the MSD at
issue, the NCUA refers the appeal to the state for appropriate action.2 9
According to an NCUA policy statement, the first step in the appeals
process is to "contact the regional office regarding the examiner's decision
within 30 days of the examiner's final determination."2 92 The policy

284.

NCUA, FINANCIAL TRENDS IN FEDERALLY INSURED CREDIT UNIONS: DECEMBER 31, 2012,

available at http://www.ncua.gov/Legal/Documents/Reports/F2O121231.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/M3S5-ALWQ.
285. NCUA, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2013).
286. NCUA, Guidelines for the Supervisory Review Committee, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,795 (Mar. 20,
1995) (also known as NCUA Interpretive Ruling and Policy Statement 95-1).
287.

In 2001, the NCUA adopted a program known as RegFlex that allowed strong credit unions

exemptions from some regulatory requirements. The NCUA subsequently amended the appeals
process to allow credit unions to appeal the NCUA's determination as to whether the credit union
qualified for RegFlex. See NCUA, Guidelines for the Supervisory Review Committee, 67 Fed. Reg.
19,778 (Apr. 23, 2002) (also known as NCUA Interpretive Ruling and Policy Statement 02-1); NCUA,
Guidelines for the Supervisory Review Committee, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,674 (Jan. 20, 2011); NCUA,
Guidelines for the Supervisory Review Committee, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,871 (Apr. 29, 2011) (combining
two previous sets of guidelines). Later, the NCUA abandoned the RegFlex program and accordingly
adjusted the list of appealable issues. NCUA, Guidelines for the Supervisory Review Committee, 77
Fed. Reg. 32,004 (May 31, 2012). The current guidelines, as amended, are available in an NCUA
Interpretive Ruling and Policy Statement. NCUA, IRPS 11-l(AS AMENDED BY I RPS 12-1),
SUPERVISORY REVIEW COMMITTEE (2012), available at http://www.ncua.gov/Legal/Documents/

IRPS/IRPS201 -1.pdf, archivedat http://perma.cc/BMZ8-MEAX [hereinafter NCUA IRPS 11-I].
288. See id. at 1.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 2. As explained earlier, the NCUA only conducts on-site examinations of those statechartered credit unions that pose greater risk to the share insurance fund. See supra note 19.
291. NCUA IRPS I 1-1,supra note 287, at 2. This situation would most likely arise when the state
credit union regulator conducted the examination that led to the appeal. See Lee Interview, supra note
13.
292. See NCUA IRPS 1-1, supra note 287, at 1.Corporate credit unions "must contact the Office
of Corporate Credit Unions," the subdivision of the NCUA that oversees their examination and
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statement is somewhat unclear about whether this mandatory step is
simply a notification to the office that oversees the examiner or whether
the notification is intended to be treated as an appeal to the examiner's
supervisor. The policy statement provides that "the dispute will be handed
[sic] by the Region and become appealable to the [Supervisory Review]
Committee either 30 days after a regional determination or 60 days after
the regional office has been contacted if it has not made a
determination."2 9 3 According to Joy K. Lee, the current chair of the
Supervisory Review Committee, the regional directors routinely
investigate credit union appeals and respond in writing during the 30-day
period.294
In any event, if the credit union's "contact" with the regional office
does not resolve the dispute, the next step in the appeals process is to
submit an appeal in writing to the NCUA's Supervisory Review
Committee. 29 5 The appeal must be authorized by the board of directors of
the credit union and "must include the name of the appellant credit union,
the determination or denial being appealed and the reasons for the
appeal."296 The policy statement encourages credit unions "to submit all
information and supporting documentation relevant to the matter in
dispute." 2 9 7 In practice, the material submitted varies widely-from a fourpage letter to several binders of material. 2 9 8 The Conimittee may then
"request additional information" from the credit union or the regional
office. 299 The Committee often sends a letter detailing these additional
required materials, but it is also common for the chair of the Committee to
have a telephone discussion with the credit union to provide more
guidance on potentially helpful documentation. 30 0 The Committee also
reviews the material that was submitted to the Regional Director and the
Regional Director's decision.30

enforcement. Id. at 2. Current chair of the NCUA's Supervisory Review Committee, Joy K. Lee, notes
that before raising the issue with the regional director, a credit union should have already raised the
issue with the examiner, the supervisory examiner, and the associate regional director. Lee Interview,
supranote 13.

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

See NCUA IRPS 11-1, supranote 287, at 2.
Lee Interview, supra note 13.
NCUA IRPS I1-1, supra note 287, at 2.
Id.
Id.

298.

Lee Interview, supra note 13.

299. NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 2.
300.

Lee Interview, supra note 13.

301.

Id
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The NCUA's Supervisory Review Committee is made up of three
"members of the NCUA's senior staff as appointed by the NCUA
Chairman." 302 No members of the Committee can directly oversee the
examination function. 3 0 3 All Committee members serve a one-year term,
but can be reappointed for additional terms. 3 0 Until recently, the NCUA
treated the makeup of the Committee as a closely guarded secret.30 s
However, facing calls for greater transparency in the wake of the financial
crisis, the NCUA now publishes the names of Committee members on its
website.306 The Committee currently consists of a program officer, the
Secretary to the NCUA Board, and the Special Assistant to the Executive
Director.30 7 A FOIA request for the names and titles of past members of
the Committee reveals that it is common for the Committee to contain an
attorney3 0 8 as well as former credit union examiners. Most Committee
members serve only one or two years.3 09
Perhaps the most novel part of the NCUA appeals process is the scope
of appealable determinations. Under NCUA's policy statement, appealable
MSDs include: "(1) composite CAMEL ratings of 3, 4, and 5 and all
component ratings of those composite ratings; (2) adequacy of loan loss
reserve provisions; and (3) loan classifications on loans that are significant
as determined by the appealing credit union. ,310 On the one hand, the
NCUA's scope of appealable matters is narrow. Under the policy

302.

NCUA IRPS i1-I, supra note 287, at i.

303.

Id (stating that no members of the Committee "shall be currently serving as a Regional

Director, Associate Regional Director, Executive Director, Director of the Office of Small Credit
Union Initiatives, or Senior Policy Advisor of Chief of Staff to a Board Member").
304. See id.
305. See Sara Snell Cooke, Editor's Column, The Absence of Light Causes Darkness, CREDIT
UNION TIMES, Nov. 7, 2012, at 4 (stating that when the Credit Union Times reported the name of the

Chairman of the Supervisory Review Committee, the NCUA asked the Credit Union Times to remove
the information from the Internet).

306. NCUA, Guidelines for the Supervisory Review Committee, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,871, 23,872
(Apr. 29, 2011).
307.

Supervisory

Review

Committee,

NCUA,

http://www.ncua.gov/Resources/CUs/Pages/

SRC.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) (listing Joy K. Lee, Special Assistant to the Executive Director,
Gerard Poliquin, Secretary of the Board, and Judy Graham, Program Officer, as members of the
Committee).
308. Attorneys who have served on the Committee include: John lanno (Trial Attorney, 1995),
Sheila Albin (Assoc. Gen. Counsel, 1996-97), Hattie M. Ulan (Special Counsel to the Gen. Counsel,
1998-2000), Chrisanthy Loizos (EEO Counselor, 2003-05), Regina Metz (Staff Attorney, 2006-07),
Linda Dent (Staff Attorney, 2008), Ross Kendall (Trial Attorney, 2009-10, 2012-2013), and Gerard
Poliquin (Sr. Trial Attorney, 2011). Letter from Regina Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (Mar.
22, 2013) (on file with author) (responding to a FOIA request for members and titles for the NCUA
Supervisory Review Committee). None of the attomeys has served as chair of the Committee. Id.

309. See id.
310. NCUA IRPS 11-1, supranote 287, at 1.
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statement, credit unions can only appeal a component CAMEL rating if
the overall composite CAMEL rating is a 3, 4, or 5.1 So, for example, a
credit union that received a 3 management rating could not appeal that
rating if the credit union received a composite rating of I or 2.312 On the
other hand, in some respects the scope of appealable matters is quite
broad. The Supervisory Review Committee can review loan classifications
if the appealing credit union considers the classification significant. 3
Moreover, a credit union's right to appeal is not cut off if NCUA imposes
formal or informal enforcement action on the credit union.3 14 However, in
those circumstances, the credit union must comply with the enforcement
action while the appeal is pending 3 15 and a reversal of the MSD would not
necessarily terminate the enforcement action.316 Nevertheless, an
enforcement action does not preclude review of an MSD by the
Committee.
In deciding the appeal, the Committee has "free rein . . . to talk to
anybody" that would provide useful information, including the original
examiner or other experts within the NCUA.317 However, the Committee
members have not, to date, visited an appealing credit union.3 " The
appealing credit union is "entitled to a personal appearance before the
Committee." 319 The credit union can choose whether to allow directors or
executives to present their case or whether to employ attorneys.3 20 In the
last few years, the NCUA has made an effort to formalize this
"appearance," making it a court-like process.321 A court reporter
transcribes the proceedings and the Committee goes "off the record and on

311.

Id.

312.

Lee Interview, supra note 13.

313. NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 1 (emphasis added); Lee Interview, supra note 13
(noting that appealing credit unions can "determine if they feel like it's a material size loan or not").
314. According to Supervisory Review Committee Chair Lee, there is "really no connection"
between enforcement actions and the right to appeal an MSD. Lee Interview, supra note 13. "Anybody

can [appeal], it doesn't matter if you have a regional director letter, a preliminary warning letter, a
letter of understanding and agreement, or cease-and-desist." Id.

315. NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at2.
316. According to Supervisory Review Committee Chair Lee, if the Committee during the appeals
process found a significant error, the NCUA would have to revisit the need for the enforcement action,
but termination of the enforcement action would not be "automatic." Lee Interview, supra note 13
(noting that this circumstance has not yet arisen at the NCUA).
317. Id. (describing circumstances where the Committee Chair spoke with an examiner, a
supervisory examiner, a chief accountant, and a record keeping specialist).

3 18. Id.
319. NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 2 (allowing the "personal appearance" to be held
"through teleconference").
320.

See Lee Interview, supra note 13.

321. See id.
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the record." 3 22 The Committee also questions the credit union.3 2 3 After the
appearance, the Committee members meet to.discuss the appeal and reach
324
a decision.
The NCUA policy statement does not specify what standard of review
the Committee should use in evaluating appeals. Joy K. Lee, the current
Chairman of the NCUA Supervisory Review Committee, explains the
standard of review as follows:
I view myself as a completely independent party. And so I look at it
like it's a brand new thing. I just don't totally go with whatever the
examiner said and I just don't, you know, completely just say,
"Well, this is the examiner's deal, the regional director's
determination, so I'm not going to open my eyes to the credit
union." I don't. I really and truly look at this as an independent
authority and I look at both sides of the coin, and try to understand,
you know, the reasons why for both parties.325
Ms. Lee also noted that she has broad investigative power to talk with
those at the credit union and within the NCUA.32 6
Once the Committee has reached a conclusion, it drafts and edits a
written decision.3 2 7 Under normal circumstances, the Committee will reach
a decision on the appeal within 30 days of the time the credit union filed
the appeal.328 The Committee sends the written decision to the credit union
as well as to the Regional Director that oversees the credit union.329 The
decisions are not routinely circulated further within the NCUA 3 30 or
released (even in redacted or summary form) to the general public.33 1

322. See id.
323. Id (stating that the Committee generally asks "very limited questions").
324. Id. (explaining that the meeting might be immediately after the appearance or on a later date,
depending on the length of the appearance).

325.
326.
327.
328.

Id.
Id.
Id.
NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 2 (noting that the 30-day timeframe is "subject to

adjustment by the Committee, whether on its own or upon request of the appellant or the Region or

other office involved").
329.

Lee Interview, supra note 13.

330. In cases where the appeal receives media attention, the decision is circulated to the NCUA's
public and congressional affairs staff as well as the NCUA Chairman. Id.
331. The NCUA released redacted decisions in response to my FOIA request. Letter from Regina
Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (Sept. 19, 2012). This is the only time decisions have been
released. See Lee Interview, supra note 13 (noting that redacted opinions had been released in

response to a single FOIA request).
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If the appealing credit union is unhappy with the Supervisory Review
Committee's decision, it can appeal to the NCUA Board.332 The NCUA's
policy statement on appeals does not further discuss the procedures the
Board uses for these appeals.33 3
At the NCUA, the Inspector General is tasked with resolving
allegations of suspected retaliation. 33 4 According to the policy statement,
"[a]ny retaliation by NCUA staff against a credit union making any type
of appeal will subject the employee to appropriate disciplinary or remedial
action by the appropriate supervisor."335 The NCUA recently added
language about their non-retaliation policy to the cover sheet that
accompanies all examination reports.33 6
2. NCUA Appeals
The NCUA does not publicly release appeals decisions in summary or
redacted form. Moreover, for much of its history, the Supervisory Review
Committee's recordkeeping was lacking. A 2012 report by the NCUA's
Inspector General "determined the [Supervisory Review Committee]
[kept] all of its records in hard-copy format in a cardboard box. During a
change in [Committee] chairpersons in late 2011, the outgoing chairperson
passed the cardboard box of files to the newly appointed chairperson." 33 7
Nevertheless, in response to my FOIA requests, the NCUA provided
redacted Supervisory Review Committee decisions. 338 I reviewed and
categorized each of these decisions. The NCUA also provided a
spreadsheet summarizing credit unions' written "contacts" 339 with NCUA

332. NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 3 (allowing credit unions thirty days to appeal to the
Board).

333. Id.
334. Id
335. Id
336.

Mary Dunn, NCUA Responding to CU Exam Issues, CREDIT UNION MAG., June 2012, at 58

(noting that a credit union trade group had received a letter from the NCUA stating that "as a result of
your input, we will add specific language on the exam report cover page to emphasize NCUA's nonretaliation policy").
337. NCUA OIG REPORT, supra note 12, at 25.
338. See Letter from Regina Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (Sept. 19, 2012) (on file with
author); Letter from Regina Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (July 19, 2013) (on file with
author).

339. As previously explained, the NCUA describes the first stage of its review process as "contact
with the regional office" rather than as an appeal. See supra note 292-294 and accompanying text.
Consequently, I have used the "contact" language throughout this section when describing appeals to

Regional Offices.
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Regional Offices concerning MSDs. 34 0 The spreadsheet shows the year
each credit union contacted the Regional Office, whether the credit union
was a federal or state-chartered credit union, the general subject matter of
the contact, the Region's actions, and whether an appeal was filed with the
Supervisory Review Committee. 341 Data in the spreadsheet begin in
2002.342 This section reports information collected from these FOIA
requests. 34 3 Because of the small number of Supervisory Review
Committee decision (6 between 1995 and 2012), the bulk of this section
reports NCUA contacts as characterized by the NCUA.
The FOIA information provided shows 140 total Regional Office
contacts. As illustrated in Figure 11, the NCUA-provided data show an
upward trend in the number of contacts per year. There are several
possible explanations. First, information about early contacts may be
incomplete. Although my FOIA request sought information on regional
office contacts beginning on January 1, 1995, the information provided
began in 2002. Information about earlier contacts may not have been kept,
or, if it was kept, was subsequently destroyed.344 Second, the financial
crisis beginning in 2008 could have led to more appeals.345 Third, the
NCUA has recently undertaken an effort to publicize its process for
appealing MSDs.346 This may have increased credit unions' utilization of
the appeals process.

340.

Letter from Regina Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (Sept. 16, 2013) (on file with

author).

341.
342.
343.
author);
author);

Id.
Id.
See Letter from Regina Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (Sept. 19, 2012) (on file with
Letter from Regina Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (July 19, 2013) (on file with
Letter from Regina Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (Sept. 16, 2013) (on file with

author).

344. Additionally, 2 Supervisory Review Committee decisions (years 2008 and 2012) do not seem
to appear on the NCUA's list of regional office contacts. Perhaps these credit unions simply did not
approach the regional office, see supra notes 292-94 and accompanying text, or perhaps this
information was missing from the information provided.
345. Lee Interview, supra note 13 (noting the financial crisis had increased appeals and that credit
unions tended to "lag behind the banks in terms of financial crisis").
346. See id.; Ulan Interview, supra note 13. See also Letter from Debbie Matz, Chairman, NCUA,
to Federally

Insured Credit Unions (Jan. 2013), available at http://www.ncua.gov/Resources/

Documents/LCU2013-01.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Z3WJ-SH82 (NCUA Letter 13-CU-01)
(noting that "information on all formal and informal appeal options available to credit unions is now
included in the exam report cover letter").
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FIGURE 11: NCUA MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATION CONTACTS
FILED WITH A REGIONAL OFFICE (2002-2012)
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Which credit unions initiated contacts? Of the 140 contacts, 126 (90%)
were made by credit unions with a federal charter and only 14 (10%) were
made by credit unions with a state charter. Although the disparity seems
large, there are almost twice as many federal credit unions as there are
state credit unions. 3 4 7 In addition, the NCUA does not annually conduct
examinations at each state-chartered credit union; it examines only those
credit unions with the most risk.3 4 8 Finally, until recently, the NCUA did
not release its examination ratings of state-chartered credit unions to the
credit unions themselves. 34 9 Each of these factors explains why more
federal credit unions than state credit unions contact regional offices
regarding MSDs.

347. See supra note 284.
348. See supra note 19.

349. Letter from Debbie Matz, Chairman, NCUA, to Federally Insured State Credit Unions (Aug.
2011), available at http://www.ncua.gov/Resources/Pages/LCU2011-12.aspx (NCUA Letter 1l-CU12).
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FIGURE 12: NCUA MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS
PROMPTING CONTACT WITH REGIONAL OFFICE (2002-2012)5o
Number

Reason for Appeal
CAMEL Composite or Component Ratings

65

Document of Resolution

47

Examiner Findings / Examination Findings

20

Report of Examination / Report Wording

14

Examiner Conduct (including Examiner Communication)

11

Risk Rating

4

Insurance Review Examination Rating

3

Figure 12 summarizes issues raised by at least 2 Regional Office
contacts. As with the OCC, Federal Reserve, and FDIC, disagreement over
CAMEL composite or component ratings was the most common reason
that credit unions used the MSD appeals process. Additionally, 47 appeals
involved a document of resolution, an enforcement tool used by examiners
encouraging the credit union to agree with recommended remedial
actions.35 Because the NCUA provided this information in spreadsheet
form, little else is know about the substance of these appeals. 35 2
Five appeals handled by the Supervisory Review Committee concerned
CAMEL composite or component ratings.353 One appeal to the
Supervisory Review Committee alleged that "agency field staff require[d]
[the credit union] to submit additional monthly reporting information in
retaliation for a complaint lodged by the credit union against a supervisory
examiner." 354 It is possible that the Committee appeals contained

350. Data for this figure were compiled from NCUA-provided summaries of regional office
contacts. As such, it contains the issues as characterized by the NCUA.
351.

NCUA,

EXAMINER'S

GUIDE

20-4

(2004),

available

at http://www.ncua.gov/Legal/

GuidesEtc/ExaminerGuide/chapter20.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2H4W-97EG (describing
documents of resolution).
352. See Letter from Regina Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (Sept. 16, 2013) (on file with
author).
353. See Letter from Regina Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (Sept. 19, 2012) (on file with
author); Letter from Regina Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (July 19, 2013) (on file with
author); In most cases, the NCUA redacted the numerical ratings (1-5) that the credit union received

from the appeals decision before releasing the Supervisory Review Committee decision through FOIA.
354. On that issue, the Committee concluded that "the Region's material supervisory
determination was based upon objective criteria." Thus, the complaint of retaliation was "not within
the purview of the [Committee]." Id.
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additional issues, but the decisions have been redacted so heavily it is
impossible to tell.3 55
FIGURE 13: OUTCOMES OF NCUA MATERIAL SUPERVISORY
DETERMINATION APPEALS PROCESS (2002-2012)356

355. For example, the press widely reported that Commodore Perry Federal Credit Union brought
an appeal alleging that "its examiner retaliated by reporting inaccurate exam findings because
management complained to the NCUA that he sexually harassed and bullied [Credit Union]
employees." See, e.g., Heather Anderson, Ohio CUs Appeal, CREDIT UNION TIMES, Oct. 31, 2012, at
1, 20. The redacted Committee decisions from this time period do not discuss any retaliation issues. Of
course, it is also possible that the press reports simply do not match the information contained in the
credit union's appeal.
356. This graph shows outcomes of all uses of the appeals process whether the appeal concluded
at the Regional Office contact or the Supervisory Review Committee. The number of total appeals
here is two more than the total regional office contacts because the FOIA data on Regional Office
contacts seems to be missing two appeals that were handled by the Supervisory Review Committee.
See supra note 344 (describing my reconciliation of the data). It is possible that some negative
outcomes of Regional Office office contacts were appealed the Supervisory Review Committee. If the
Committee issued a decision after the close of 2013, the final outcome of the appeals process would
not be captured in Figure 13. Thus, Figure 13 might understate the success rate for appeals. Complete
Supervisory Review Committee data are not available for 2013. Preliminary information shows that
the Committee issued at least 3 decisions in 2013. These decisions involved appeals of CAMEL
composite and component ratings and resulted in decisions upholding the initial examiner decision.
Thus, to the extent that Figure 13 might understate the rate of success, the discrepancy is likely slight.
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When credit unions use the NCUA's MSD appeals process, they rarely
succeed in overturning the initial examination determination. As illustrated
in Figure 13, the overall success was 18% (26/142). Seventy percent
(98/140) of Regional Office contacts upheld the examiner decision. 357 Less
than 20% (25/140) of Region Office contacts amended the examiner
decision. In spite of the low rate of credit union success at the Regional
Office contact level, there are few appeals filed with the NCUA's
Supervisory Review Committee. The Committee issued only 6 decisions
between 1995 and 2012. Five of those Committee decisions upheld the
examiner decisions. In the single successful Supervisory Review
Committee appeal, a credit union challenged the Office of Small Credit
Union Initiative's decision to deny a $5,000 grant reimbursement. Only 1
MSD appeal has been filed with the NCUA Board, and it was withdrawn
before the Board issued a decision.3 ss
III. WEAKNESSES IN THE APPEALS PROCESSES
Analysis of the MSD appeals processes shows significant weaknesses.
This section will address three weaknesses in more detail: (1) the lack of
consistency among regulators, (2) the small number of appeals, and (3) the
lack of transparency regarding appeals.
A. VariationsAmong Regulators
First, there are significant differences among the MSD appeals
processes used by each regulator. This is true even though regulators, at
the urging of Congress, generally strive for consistency in the examination
process.359 Any time four separate regulators implement a single statute,

357.

Outcome data for regional office contacts were compiled from the FOIA-provided summary

of regional office contacts. See supra note 339-340 and accompanying text (describing these data).
"Amended" refers to those instances where the appeals process reversed the examiner decision in

whole or in part. As such, it is the combination of the "reversed" and "mixed" data categories reported
for OCC, Federal Reserve, and FDIC appeals. See supra Figures 3, 6, 10. The "Other" category
consists of contacts that the NCUA described as "resolved" (1), "reevaluated" (1), "addressed" (11),
"explained" (2), and "updated" (2).
358.

See Heather Anderson, Commodore Stops Appeal, CREDIT UNION TIMES, Apr. 3, 2013, at 1,

23 (noting that a credit union had filed, but then withdrawn a Board-level appeal); Lee Interview,
supra note 13 (stating the Board had never decided an appeal).
359. Congress created the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council in 1979 to
"prescribe uniform principles and standards for the Federal examination of financial institutions ...
and make recommendations to promote uniformity in the supervision of these financial institutions."

12 U.S.C. § 3301 (2012). Working together as part of the Examination Council, officials from each
regulator developed the CAMELS system. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. To ensure
that the CAMELS system is consistently implemented across each of the federal regulators, the
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differences are likely to arise. While policies should be tailored to meet the
unique structure of the agency and the nature of the regulated institutions,
policies should not advantage or disadvantage financial institutions based
solely on the institutions' primary federal regulator. Regulatory decisions
regarding the scope of appealable items and the standard of review used
when evaluating an appeal have the potential to significantly alter the
substantive rights of financial institutions. Such differences are
inconsistent with Congressional and regulatory policies promoting
uniformity.
1. Scope of Appealable Matters
Congress required that regulators provide a process for appealing
"material supervisory determinations." Regulators disagree as to what this
means. This section focuses on area of divergence: (1) differences in the
appealability of examination ratings and (2) differences in the
appealability of MSDs related to enforcement actions. In both of these
cases, differences in the scope of appealable matters mean that some
financial institutions have greater access to an appeals process than others.
a. CAMELS Ratings
Congress defined MSD to include "examination ratings."3 60 The OCC,
Federal Reserve, and FDIC allow financial institutions to appeal any
examination rating.36' The NCUA, however, only allows appeals of
"composite CAMEL ratings of 3, 4, and 5 and all component ratings of
those composite ratings."362 That means a credit union with a composite
CAMEL rating of 2 and a management rating of 3 or 4 cannot appeal
either the composite rating or the management rating. 36 3 Yet such appeals

Examination Council "conduct[s] schools for examiners and assistant examiners." 12 U.S.C. § 3305(d)
(2012).
360. 12 U.S.C. § 4806(f)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
361. The OCC policy allows appeal of "[e]xamination ratings." OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supra
note 10. The Federal Reserve policy defines "material supervisory determination" to include
"examination or inspection composite ratings," Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed.

Reg. 16,470, 16,473 (Mar. 30, 1995), and the information provided shows appeals for CAMELS
composite and component ratings. The FDIC policy allows appeals of CAMELS ratings, IT ratings,
trust ratings, CRA ratings, and consumer compliance ratings. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77

Fed. Reg. 17,055, 17,057 (Mar. 23, 2012).
362. NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 3.
363. Lee Interview, supra note 13.
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have been heard by both the OCC and FDIC.364 Credit unions, thus, have
less access to an appeals process.
b. Enforcement-RelatedDeterminations
The handling of MSDs related to enforcement actions is even more
fractured. Congress specified that MSDs do not include regulators'
decisions to close financial institutions or take prompt corrective action,
including the removal of officers and directors, from undercapitalized
institutions.
Congress added that the MSD appeals process does not
"affect the authority of an appropriate Federal banking agency or the
National Credit Union Administration Board to take enforcement or
supervisory action." 366 While this seems to preclude using the MSD
appeals processes to directly challenge prompt corrective action directives,
it gives regulators leeway in dealing with determinations related to formal
or informal enforcement actions.
OCC-regulated banks can use the MSD appeals process to challenge
findings that a bank has not complied with an enforcement action. 367
addition, an OCC-regulated bank can challenge CAMELS ratings and
other MSDs while under an enforcement action, 36 8 but cannot challenge
"the underlying facts that form the basis of a recommended or pending
formal enforcement action and the acts or practices that are the subject of a
pending formal enforcement action." 369

364. See, e.g., Material Supervisory Determination of First Quarter 2006, OCC Q.J., Mar. 2006,
at 37 (2006) (appeal of composite and component rating); FDIC, Appeal of Material Supervisory
Determination: Guidelines & Decisions, SARC-2004-02 (FDIC Apr. 12, 2004) (appeal of CAMELS
compenent ratings for asset quality and management), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/

laws/sarc/sarcappeals/sarc2004O2.html, archived at http://perna.cc/H4HA-3XCV (appeal of
CAMELS component ratings for asset quality and management). Although the Federal Reserve's
guidelines are worded broadly enough to allow appeals from institutions with a I or 2 composite

rating, the data gathered through FOIA are insufficient to confirm that the Federal Reserve has actually
considered appeals from such institutions.
365. 12 U.S.C. § 4806(f)(1)(B) (2012).
366. Id. § 4806(g).
367. OCC BULLETiN 2013-15, supra note 10. Earlier OCC policies did not allow banks to use the
MSD appeals process to challenge examiner findings that the bank did not comply with an
enforcement action. See Material Supervisory Determination Decision of Second Quarter 2012,
http://www.occ.gov/topics/dispute-resolutionfbank-appeals/summaries/appeal-composite-componentratings-q2-2012.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4X8A-ZR4W (appeal of composite and component
ratings and violations of law).
368. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. Under the OCC's initial MSD appeals

procedures, banks had more leeway to appeal MSDs underlying enforcement actions. See Golden
Interview, supra note 13; Hearing on H.R. 3461, supra note 5, at 53 (testimony of Eugene A. Ludwig,
Founder & CEO, Promontory Financial Group, LLC).
369.

OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supra note 10, at n.i.
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The Federal Reserve policy states that its MSD appeals process cannot
be used to appeal "prompt corrective action directives . . . actions to
impose administrative enforcement actions . . . , capital directives, and
orders issued pursuant to applications under the [Bank Holding Company]
Act." 37 0 However, in one instance the Federal Reserve heard an appeal
about whether a memorandum of understanding should remain in effect
and in another instance evaluated the accuracy of an examination finding
that a bank had not complied with an enforcement action.
The FDIC's policy is the most restrictive. It explicitly prohibits appeals
of formal enforcement actions as well as "determinations and the
underlying facts and circumstances that form the basis of a
recommendation
or pending formal
enforcement action"
and
"determinations regarding compliance with an existing formal
enforcement action." 37 1 Furthermore, FDIC does not allow appeals of
"[d]ecisions to initiate informal enforcement actions (such as memoranda
of understanding)." 3 72
The NCUA's MSD appeals policy states that it is not available for
"appeals of various administrative and enforcement actions." 373 Joy K.
Lee, Chair of the NCUA's Supervisory Review Committee, explains that
an enforcement action does not cut off a credit union's right to use the
MSD appeals process; credit unions can still challenge facts that relate to
the enforcement action.374
In sum, regulators reach different conclusions about whether financial
institutions can appeal the facts and determinations underlying
enforcement actions and about whether institutions can appeal a
determination that the institution is not in compliance with an enforcement
action.
2. StandardofReview
There is also disagreement and general confusion among regulators
about the standard of review for evaluating MSD appeals. "Standard of

370. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,470, 16.473 (Mar. 30, 1995).
371. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,055, 17,057 (Mar. 23, 2012). Earlier
FDIC policies were not so restrictive. Id at 17,056 (noting the FDIC policy was amended in 2008 "to
modify the supervisory determinations eligible for appeal to eliminate the ability of an FDICsupervised institution to file an appeal with the SARC for determinations, or the facts and
circumstances underlying a recommended or pending formal enforcement-related action or decision,
and to make limited technical amendments").

372. Id. at 17,057.
373. NCUA IRPS, supranote 287, at 3.
374. See supra notes 314-16 and accompanying text.
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review" refers to the level of deference the appellate authority affords the
earlier decision maker. 375 Possible standards of review range from the
deferential "abuse of discretion" standard to the non-deferential "de novo"
standard.37 6 Because changing the standard of review adjusts deference
given to the earlier determination, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
that the standard of review used could make a practical difference in the
outcome of a case.377 Thus, financial institutions that are allowed to appeal
using a non-deferential standard of review could have a much better
chance of success than those appealing under a more deferential standard.
The Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of
1994 does not specify a standard of review for the appeals processes.378
Without direction, regulators have adopted widely differing standards.
The OCC policy states that "the appeal is limited to a consideration of
whether the examiners appropriately applied agency policies and
standards." 3 79 The current OCC Ombudsman says this approach is a
"standard-based" review that does not give "deference to either side."so
The inaugural OCC Ombudsman described the standard of review as de
novo.381

The Federal Reserve, while stating that it wanted all institutions to
receive "the same appellant rights regardless of the Federal Reserve
district in which they reside," did not adopt an agencywide standard of
review. 382 Left to their own judgment, regional Federal Reserve Banks
provide a potpourri of standards of review from de novo in New York, to
ad hoc (but probably not de novo) standards in Kansas City, to "findings
and conclusions were based on sufficient evidence and were consistent
with FRS policy" in Minneapolis, to no stated standard in other regions. 383

375. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1535 (9th ed. 2009) ("The criterion by which an appellate
court exercising appellate jurisdiction measures the constitutionality of a statute or the propriety of an

order, finding, or judgment entered by a lower court.").
See Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse ofStandards ofReview, 13 LEWIS

&

376.

CLARK L. REV. 233, 243-46 (2009) (explaining that in "de novo" review the appellate body simply
reviews the issue anew while in "abuse of discretion" review the appellate body uses a much higher
threshold, such as whether the initial decision was "outside the scope of the applicable law").
377. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999) ("The upshot in terms of judicial review is
some practical difference in outcome depending upon which standard is used."). But see, e.g., David
Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 135 (2010) (concluding that "regardless of the
standard of review, courts affirm agencies' actions slightly more than two thirds of the time").

378. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 4806 (2012).
379. OCC BULLETIN2013-15, supra note 10.
380. See supranotes 114-16 and accompanying text.
381. See supranotes 112-13 and accompanying text.

382. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,470, 16,472 (Mar. 30, 1995).
383. See supranotes 184-91 and accompanying text.
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The FDIC "review[s] the appeal for consistency with the policies,
practices, and mission of the FDIC and the overall reasonableness of, and
the support offered for, the positions advanced." 384
Neither the NCUA MSD appeals policy nor the appeals decisions
themselves provide a statement on the appropriate standard of review. Joy
K. Lee, Chair of the NCUA's Supervisory Review Committee, describes a
review process that does not give deference to either credit union or the
examiner. 85
B. Few Appeals
Another shortcoming of the current MSD appeals processes is that
there are few appeals. Thousands of financial institutions have been
examined every year since regulators adopted MSD appeals policies in
1995. Yet the OCC Ombudsman has issued 157 decisions, the Federal
Reserve has decided 25 appeals (although data from 1995-2000 are
unavailable for the Federal Reserve), the FDIC's Supervision Appeals
Review Committee has issued 63 decisions, and the NCUA's Supervisory
Review Committee has issued six decisions.386 One regulator has touted
the small number of appeals as evidence that institutions are happy with
the examination process and that examiners make few mistakes.38 7 There
is, however, reason to believe this view is overly optimistic.
Surveys suggest that financial institutions would like to appeal MSDs
far more often than they actually do. In 2011, the Alliance of Bankers
Associations, in connection with the American Bankers Association,
conducted a nation-wide survey questioning banks about their most recent
examination. The survey, which received more than 1000 responses, asked
banks to rate satisfaction with the most recent examination and results on a
1 to 5 scale with I being very satisfied and 5 being very unsatisfied. More
than 30% of responding banks were unsatisfied or very unsatisfied.38 8

384. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,055, 17,058 (Mar. 23, 2012).
385. See supra notes 325-26 and accompanying text.
386. The number of appeals at the FDIC and NCUA is somewhat larger if you consider appeals to
or contacts with officials housed within the regulators' examination functions (Director or Regional
Office appeals). See supra Figures 8, 11. But even considering these early-stage appeals, utilization of
the MSD appeals processes seems low.
387.

Heather Anderson, Marquis: Lack of Appeals a Sign the Exam System Is Working, CREDIT

UNION TIMES, July 6, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 14198420 ("The fact that only four credit
unions have elevated an exam appeal to the NCUA's supervisory review committee in the past 10
years is a sign the exam system is working, [NCUA] Executive Director David Marquis told Credit
Union Times.").
388. AM. BANKERS Ass'N & STATE BANKERS Ass'NS, SUMMARY REPORT FROM BANKS
SUPERVISED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY 5 (2012), available at
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Respondents were also asked to evaluate agreement with the assigned
CAMELS rating on the same I to 5 scale. That question yielded an
average response of 3.38,389 evidencing some disagreement with
examination ratings.
Moreover, surveys of credit unions produced similar results. In 2010,
the Credit Union National Association conducted a survey in which "27%
of respondents reported dissatisfaction with their most recent exam." 390
Moreover, "one-in-five (21%) [of the responding credit unions] indicated
that they wanted to appeal but did not." 39 1"Two-thirds of the credit unions
that wanted to appeal indicated they did not appeal for fear of retaliation
by examination staff. Nearly the same number indicated they did not
appeal because they did not believe it would make a difference in
outcome."392
The Credit Union National Association performed a second survey
about the examination process in 2012. While it did not specifically ask
about the MSD appeals process, it did ask about credit unions' agreement
with examination results. The survey found that 25% of respondents were
unhappy with their most recent examination and results. 393 In addition,
22% of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with their current CAMEL
rating.394

http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/news/ReportforOCCMarch2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
BP5Q-SQRB (N=203, 10% very dissatisfied, 23% dissatisfied, 17% neutral, 32% satisfied, 18% very
satisfied); AM. BANKERS Ass'N & STATE BANKERS Ass'NS, SUMMARY REPORT FOR THE FEDERAL
RESERVE 5 (2012), available at http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/news/ReportforFedMarch

2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/U436-9H84 (N=133, 15% very dissatisfied, 20% dissatisfied,
17% neutral, 26% satisfied, 21% very satisfied); AM. BANKERS ASS'N & STATE BANKERS ASS'NS,
SUMMARY REPORT FOR BANKS EXAMINED BY THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION 5

&

(2012), available at http://www.aba.com/abaldocuments/news/ReportforFDICApril2012.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/2JUH-BD4F (N=397, 13% very dissatisfied, 21% dissatisfied, 17% neutral, 31%
satisfied, 17% very satisfied). See also Joe Adler, Banker-Examiner Relationship, Once Testy, Thaws,
AM. BANKER, June 11, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 12040228 (reporting on the survey).
389. Adler, supranote 388.
390. Hearing on H.R. 3461, supra note 5, at 150 (written statement of Ken Watts, President
CEO, West Virginia Credit Union League) (citing a Credit Union National Association survey).
391. Id
392. Id Additionally, "[o]ver one-third of credit unions who had examination concerns did not
appeal because they were not aware of the process." Id.
393.

CREDIT UNION NAT'L ASS'N, 2012 CREDIT UNION EXAMS SURVEY (on file with author)

(N=1531, 10% very dissatisfied, 15% somewhat dissatisfied, 15% neutral, 39% satisfied, 21% very
satisfied).
394. Id. (N=1531, 8% very dissatisfied, 14% somewhat dissatisfied, 17% neutral, 39% satisfied,
23% very satisfied).
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These surveys are not without their faults. 395 Each of the surveys relied
on financial institutions voluntarily completing the survey form. Those
dissatisfied with the examination process may have been more motivated
to complete the survey. Thus, it may not be possible to extrapolate the
survey results to the entire population of financial institutions.
Nevertheless, the number of survey respondents that reported
dissatisfaction with their examination is far greater than the number of
financial institutions that utilized the MSD appeals processes. Thus, while
it might not be possible to predict the ideal number of appeals, the survey
data suggest the appeal processes are not functioning properly. Some
financial institutions believe that appealing is futile. Others fear retaliation.
C. Little Transparency
Finally, the MSD appeals processes are far from transparent. It can be
difficult or even impossible to get information about appeals decisions.
Without transparency it is difficult to realize the objectives Congress
sought in mandating MSD appeals processes: correcting "uneven
treatment by examiners" and fostering "confidence" in the regulatory
396
process.
Written and regularly disseminated decisions serve several functions.
First, they can be a learning tool for regulators themselves. If decisions are
public, all regulators can review the decisions and compare them with their
current examination practices. How can regulators be expected to achieve
any measure of consistency (either within an agency or across agencies) if
one regulator has no idea what other regulators are doing? 39 7 Second,
written decisions act as guideposts for financial institutions. Institutions
are better able to comply with regulator expectations when they
understand what the regulators expect. Third, written decisions give the
public a way to evaluate the MSD appeals processes and the examination
function overall. As President Obama explains, "[t]ransparency promotes

395. An FDIC spokesman stated that the Alliance of Bankers Associations survey "has inherent
limitations based on geography, sample size and other methodological issues." Adler, supra note 388.

396. S. REP. No. 103-169, at 51 (1993), reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881, 1935.
397.

Cf Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings,

62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1371, 1372 (1995) (asserting that written judicial opinions are a device to "impose
consistency and correct the judges who 'err'). Perhaps some regulatory consistency could be achieved

by circulating decisions within an agency and sharing decisions across agencies. However, there is
little evidence that regulators do this.
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accountability and provides information for citizens about what their
Government is doing." 39 8
Of course, the OCC and FDIC deserve credit for releasing some
appeals decisions. The OCC provides summaries of Ombudsman
decisions, and the FDIC provides redacted Supervision Appeals Review
Committee decisions.399 In both cases, the materials released generally
allow readers to determine (1) the reason the appealing bank believes
examiners erred, (2) the applicable law, regulation, or agency guidance,
and (3) the appellate authority's decision and accompanying reasoning.
The Federal Reserve and NCUA are not as forthcoming. Even in response
to FOIA requests, the Federal Reserve has never released its opinions.400
Although the NCUA did release decisions from its Supervisory Review
401*
Committee, in many cases the opinions were so heavily redacted it was
difficult to determine the precise nature of the controversy, the applicable
law (or agency guidance), and the factors influencing the Committee
decision.4 02
MSD appeals that result in written decisions by the OCC's
Ombudsman, the FDIC's Supervision Appeals Review Committee, and
the NCUA's Supervisory Review Committee capture only part of the
financial institutions that use the appeals processes. In each of those cases
the institution has either the option or the requirement to first pursue an
appeal with an agency official who supervised the examination.40 3 The
decisions reached at these earlier stages of the MSD appeals processes are
a near complete black box. No regulator has released any written decision
from this stage of the process. Furthermore, no regulator systematically
provides summary information about appeals handled at this stage. Do
financial institutions appeal? What do they appeal? Do they ever win?
What do these decisions teach us about regulatory reasoning? Are these
decisions consistent with one another? While I did my best to unravel the
answers to these questions through FOIA requests and regulator
interviews, much of this stage of the appeals processes remains a mystery.

398. Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009) (Memorandum from
Barack Obama, President of the United States, to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies).
399. See supra notes 133-35, 255-56,266 and accompanying text.
400. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.

401. See supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text.
402. For example, an NCUA decision obtained through FOIA contained a paragraph that began:
"According to the NCUA's LCU No. 07-CU-12, CAMEL [redacted] credit unions." The remainder of
the paragraph likely contained the NCUA's standard for a 3, 4, or 5 rated credit union. However, the
remainder was entirely redacted.
403. See supra notes 80-82, 231, 292-94 and accompanying text.
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Secrecy at this early stage of the MSD appeals processes may be
especially problematic. These appeals are not addressed by a single
appellate authority within each regulator but are instead handled by a
variety of decision-makers. One division, region, or office may decide
appeals differently than another division, region, or office. Moreover,
because this level of appeal is addressed to an agency official more closely
associated with the examination staff, this may be the stage at which the
appeal is most likely to induce examiner retaliation.
In sum, the lack of transparency stands as a barrier to consistency and
confidence in the examination process.
IV. STRENGTHENING THE APPEALS PROCESSES

Given the weaknesses in the current MSD appeals processes, I
recommend three changes. First, once examiners issue an MSD, financial
institutions should have direct access to an appellate authority outside of
the examination function. Second, the appellate authority should engage in
a robust review. The review should consider a broad scope of appealable
matters and employ a clear and rigorous standard of review. The scope of
review and standard of review should be consistent across regulators.
Third, regulators should release detailed information about each decision
reached by the appellate authority. This Part will discuss these
recommendations in more detail, but one of the virtues of these
suggestions is that they could all be implemented voluntarily by the
regulators. Congressional action would not be required.4 0 This Part will
also address a more drastic proposal that would require Congressional
action: the creation of a single super-Ombudsman for all financial
institution MSD appeals.
A. StrengthenedIndependence ofReview
Once examiners issue an MSD, financial institutions should have direct
access to a dedicated appellate authority outside of the examination
function. The OCC is currently the only regulator to provide this access;
OCC-regulated banks can appeal directly to the Ombudsman. 4 05 FDICregulated banks and credit unions first address an appeal to an official who
oversees the examination function.4 0 6 Federal Reserve-regulated

404. Of course, Congress could also choose to impose these requirements.
405. OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supranote 10.
406. See supra note 403.
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institutions first address an appeal to an ad hoc committee that changes
with each appeal. 4 07 I propose that FDIC-regulated banks be allowed to
appeal directly to the Supervision Appeals Review Committee and credit
unions be allowed to appeal directly to the Supervisory Review
Committee. I also propose that the Federal Reserve create an appellate
authority to review MSDs. The appellate authority should consist of a
person or group of persons who are not part of the examination function.
Moreover, membership of the appellate authority should be consistent and
not change with each appeal.
The benefits of direct access to a dedicated appellate authority outside
the examination function are threefold. First, consistent decisions are more
likely to come from a single appellate authority (whether consisting of an
individual or a small group) than from a number of different individuals
who do not deliberate together (as is the case when appeals are first routed
through division, region, or office directors).
Second, a single appellate authority promotes transparency. Regulators
do not regularly release any information about early-stage appeals that are
routed to a division, region, or office director. Perhaps this is partly
because these officials are so connected with the examination function that
they presume complete secrecy is preferable. Allowing appeals to instead
begin with a dedicated appellate authority outside the examination
function may facilitate public release of summary or redacted opinions. A
dedicated appellate authority outside the examination function may be
better able to balance protection of information that could lead to banking
runs with disclosure of information that could improve the examination
function. Indeed, the OCC Ombudsman and FDIC Supervision Appeals
Review Committee (appellate authorities outside the examination
function) already strike a reasonable balance when they release their
decisions.40 8
Third, a more independent appellate authority may increase bank
confidence in the MSD appeals processes. Financial institutions that
disagree with an MSD may view the regulator's examination function with
suspicion. Assigning the first step of the examination function to
examination officials does little to assuage this concern. Institutions would
likely view a dedicated appellate authority outside the examination
function as more independent, particularly if that authority publicly
disclosed its decisions. The OCC gives its banks the choice of filing with

407. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.

408. See supra notes 133-34, 255 and accompanying text (explaining the OCC's practice of
releasing summary decisions and the FDIC's practice of releasing redacted decisions).
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the Ombudsman or the Deputy Comptroller of the supervisory district that
oversees the bank.409 Current Ombudsman Hattix estimates that about
eighty percent start directly with the Comptroller. 4 10 This suggests most
banks prefer the appellate authority outside the examination function.
B. Robust Review Authority
Next, regulators should empower their appellate authorities to conduct
robust reviews of MSDs. Each appellate authority should consider a broad
scope of appealable matters. Furthermore, in considering appeals, the
appellate authority should employ a consistent and robust standard of
review.
1. BroadScope ofAppealable Matters
Financial institutions should be able to use the MSD appeals processes
to challenge a wide variety of MSDs. All regulators should define
appealable MSDs to include any examination rating. In addition,
institutions should be able to appeal some enforcement action-related
MSDs.
a. Examination Ratings
The NCUA is the only regulator to restrict institutions' ability to appeal
examination ratings. 4 11 The NCUA allows appeals of CAMEL ratings
(composite and component) only when the composite rating is 3, 4, or 5.412
The NCUA defends excluding credits unions with a 1 or 2 CAMEL
composite rating by noting that these credit unions have little reason to
appeal.413 Yet banks have appealed CAMELS 2 ratings.414 These banks
may be worried that unless errors are corrected early, the
misunderstanding will eventually lead to further ratings downgrades and
enforcement actions. At any rate, even the NCUA would likely concede
that allowing appeals from 1 and 2 rated credit unions is unlikely to flood

409. OCC BULLETN 2013-15, supranote 10.
410.

See Hattix Interview, supranote 13.

411. See supra Part III.A.I.a.
412. NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 1.
413. Ulan Interview, supra note 13 (stating that "in practical terms, it doesn't matter whether [a
credit union is rated] a I or a 2").
414. See supranote 364.
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the NCUA's seldom-used system. The NCUA should allow appeals on par
with other financial institution regulators.
b. Enforcement-RelatedDeterminations
There is little agreement among regulators about the extent to which
institutions can use the MSD appeals processes to challenge
determinations related to informal or formal enforcement actions. 4 15 The
issue, however, is important. Regulators typically place institutions that
receive a 3, 4, or 5 composite CAMELS rating under informal or formal
enforcement action.4 16 Although there are processes for contesting formal
enforcement actions,4 17 doing so is costly and actions are reviewed under
standards deferential to the regulator. Thus, most banks do not challenge
enforcement actions.4 18 All informal enforcement actions419 and the vast
majority of formal enforcement actions are entered by consent.4 20 In those
circumstances, institutions have little opportunity to correct examiner
mistakes. And by excluding enforcement-related determinations from the
MSD appeals processes, regulators significantly restrict the usefulness of
the processes. For this reason, Eugene A. Ludwig, a former Comptroller of
the Currency, proposes that financial institutions be allowed to use the
MSD appeals processes for issues related to enforcement actions.4 21
My proposal is more specific. I suggest that institutions be able to use
the MSD appeals processes for any material finding or decision underlying
an informal or formal enforcement action entered by consent. Institutions
should also be able to use the MSD appeals processes to challenge
findings that the institution has not complied with an existing enforcement
action, unless the regulator is currently asking a court to enforce the

415. See supra Part l1.A.1.b.
416. Rives, supra note 29. See also 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(8) (2012) (allowing regulators to impose
formal enforcement when an institution receives "a less-than-satisfactory rating for asset quality,
management, earnings, or liquidity").

417. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b), 1831o (2012).
418. See supra note 43.
419. Hill, supra note 29, at 662-63 (explaining that "regulators acknowledge that they have
informal regulatory powers" to convince banks to willingly enter informal enforcement actions like

board resolutions, commitment letters, safety and soundness plans, and memoranda of understanding).
420. See id at 675 (finding that 90% of formal capital enforcement actions between 1993 and
2010 were entered with the consent of the bank).
421.

Ludwig, supra note 48, at 9 ("If the ombudsman cannot delve into enforcement matters, he or

she is precluded from getting into a whole variety of issues that could involve mistakes. Furthermore,
matters involving enforcement actions typically are of great importance to the regulated financial

institution. A second pair of eyes in such important cases not only avoids unnecessary harm but also
enhances the agency's stature as a place of probity and fairness.").
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existing enforcement action. In either case, the regulator would not be
constrained in its ability to pursue an enforcement action and any
enforcement action would remain in force during the pendency of the
MSD appeal.
I further propose that if the appellate authority decides that one or more
MSDs were erroneous, top regulatory officials 42 2 would consider whether
the enforcement action should be withdrawn. If the regulator chooses not
to lift the enforcement action, the institution should be given the option to
withdraw its consent to the action. 423 The regulator could then pursue
formal enforcement actions under existing statutory authority, including
statutes that allow for temporary orders without pre-order hearings in
high-risk cases.424 In less urgent cases (such as when a regulator seeks a
cease-and-desist order for an unsafe or unsound condition), the institution
could contest the action through the hearing process.
In the past, regulators have resisted proposals to allow appeals of
enforcement action-related MSDs, claiming that such appeals would
dangerously delay the enforcement process.42 5 My proposal, however,
does not affect enforcement authority; it allows regulators the same
essential tools they have now. It only provides a mechanism for
institutions to ask regulators to reconsider underlying MSDs. In addition,
both the OCC and FDIC have, at times, allowed review of MSDs related
to enforcement actions.426 There is no indication that institutions' use of
the MSD appeals processes during the time these appeals were allowed
hampered enforcement activity.
Regulators assert additional review of enforcement-related MSDs is
unnecessary because agency officials already vet enforcement actions,
minimizing the chances for regulatory error and overreach.427 Regulators,
however, tend to give the greatest scrutiny to those enforcement actions
contested by financial institutions. Top agency officials rarely review or

422.

I propose that the review of these enforcement actions happen at the highest level within the

regulator: the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC Board of Directors,
and the NCUA Board of Directors.

423. The financial institution's board of directors should vote to approve the institution's
withdrawal from the enforcement action.

424. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(c), 1786(f) (2012).
425. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appellate Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,923, 15,926 (Mar. 28, 1995)
(rejecting suggestion that "decisions to initiate informal enforcement actions . . . be appealable"

because of "the possible abuse of the appeals process to delay or otherwise impede well-founded
enforcement actions").
426.

See supranotes 368, 371.

427. FDIC, Guidelines for Appeals of Material Supervisory Determinations, 73 Fed. Reg. 54,822,
54,824 (Sept. 23, 2008) ("All FDIC formal enforcement actions are reviewed by a number of highlevel FDIC officials both prior and subsequent to their initiation.").
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approve enforcement actions entered with an institution's consent. At the
FDIC, enforcement action decisions are commonly made by a regional
director or regional counsel.42 8 The FDIC's Washington office only
becomes involved if the bank requests a hearing. 429 The process is similar
at the OCC 43 0 and Federal Reserve. 4 3 1 Because the vast majority of
enforcement actions are entered by consent, the internal and opaque
vetting processes provide little assurance of consistency.
Finally, regulators note that financial institutions facing enforcement
actions already have access to other appeals mechanisms. 4 32 If an
institution is unhappy with an MSD underlying an enforcement action,
why not just contest the enforcement action itself? The answer is that
contesting an enforcement action is a formal, expensive, and timeconsuming process. The institution must hire an attorney to represent it in
a formal hearing before an administrative law judge.433 Following the
recommendation decision by the administrative law judge, the regulator
issues a "final decision and order based on the entire record of proceeding,
which is subject to limited review by an appropriate court of appeals.'A 34
The entire process can take two to five years. 4 35 During those two to five
years, the regulator continues to examine the bank, making additional
material supervisory determinations and requesting or demanding

428. Hill, supra note 29, at 705.
429. FDIC, Guidelines for Appeals of Material Supervisory Determinations, 73 Fed. Reg. at
54,824.
430. Examining the Settlement Practices of U.S. Financial Regulators: Hearing Before the H.

Comm. on Fin. Servs., I12th Cong. 115-16 (2012) [hereinafter Settlement PracticesHearing] (written
statement of Daniel P. Stipano, Deputy Chief Counsel, OCC) (explaining that enforcement actions are

generally approved by one of several supervision review committees).
431. Letter from Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
to Senator Elizabeth Warren & Representative Elijah E. Cummings (Dec. 16, 2013), available at
http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/migrated/uploads/12%

2016%2013%20Reply/o20to%2OCummings%20%20Warren%201.pdf (stating that, of the "nearly
1,000 formal, public enforcement actions the Federal Reserve has taken over the past 10 years," only
eleven were contested and therefore approved by the Federal Reserve Board).

432. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,470, 16,472 (Mar. 30, 1995)
(rejecting a suggestion to allow appeals of some enforcement-related

items because an existing

"alterative [sic] appeals mechanism" allowed banks to "contest enforcement actions"); FDIC,
Guidelines for Appeals of Material Supervisory Determinations, 73 Fed. Reg. at 54,823 ("[T]he
administrative hearing process and the right to court review of final enforcement orders have

uniformly been found to provide all required due process.").
433. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(h), 1786 (2012). Financial institutions cannot bypass the
administrative law judge review. Judicial review is available only after an administrative law judge
decision. Id.
434. Settlement PracticesHearing, supra note 430, at 117 (written statement of Daniel P. Stipano,

Deputy Chief Counsel, OCC).
435. Id.
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additional changes.436 In these circumstances, it seems reasonable to
conclude that institutions would be most likely to contest egregious and
costly errors. If an institution could comply with an enforcement action at
a lower cost than challenging the enforcement action, that institution might
rationally consent to an enforcement action, even if it believes the action is
unwarranted.4 37
In contrast, the MSD appeals processes are informal, inexpensive, and
speedy. Institutions can make their case directly to the appellate authority;
they need not employ an attorney.4 38 Even in complicated cases, the appeal
is heard and decided within a year.439 The appealing institution avoids a
drawn-out, contentious process with an agency with whom it hopes to
preserve a working relationship. Thus, a financial institution might use the
MSD appeals process even if it would not contest an enforcement action.
There are at least two pieces of evidence to support this conclusion. First,
some banks have brought enforcement-related appeals through the MSD
appeals processes.44 0 Second, in 2008, when the FDIC removed
enforcement-related determinations from the list of appealable MSDs,
bankers' comments uniformly protested the decision."
In sum, if regulators adopted a broader scope of appealable MSDs,
institutions would have more opportunity to correct examiner errors and
we could be more confident that the MSD appeals processes provided
consistent rights to all financial institutions.
2. Clearand Rigorous StandardofReview
Next, regulators should adopt a clear and rigorous standard of review
for MSD appeals. As explained in Part III.A.2, there is inconsistency and
confusion regarding the standard of review used by regulators in MSD

436. See supra note 19 and accompany text (explaining that regulators generally conduct yearly
examination).

437. One hint that not all institutions who enter into enforcement action by consent agree with
their regulators: these enforcement actions almost never contain admissions that the institution violated
law, policy, or agency guidance. See Settlement Practices Hearing, supra note 430, at 7, 10, 12

(statements of Scott G. Alvarez, Gen. Counsel, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.; Richard J.
Osterman, Jr., Deputy Gen. Counsel, FDIC; and Daniel P. Stipano, Deputy Chief Counsel, OCC).
438. See supra notes 89, 320 and accompanying text.
439.

See OCC OG REPORT, supranote 12, at 10; FEDERAL RESERVE OIG REPORT, supra note 12,

at 22; FDIC OIG REPORT, supranote 12, at 33; NCUA OlG REPORT, supranote 12, at 24.
440. See supra Figures 2,5, 9.
441. FDIC, Guidelines for Appeals of Material Supervisory Determinations, 73 Fed. Reg. 54,822,
54,823 (Sept. 23, 2008) ("The commenters uniformly expressed support for an independent review of
underlying facts, circumstances, and determinations, and that there needs to be 'an effective and non-

biased appeals procedure for banks.'").
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appeals. Regulatory adoption of a uniform, clear, and rigorous standard of
review could make the MSD appeals processes more useful in achieving
consistency. I would select a de novo standard for both findings of fact
and issues of law and policy.
At present, three regulators consider whether the MSD is consistent
with regulator policies and standards.442 This check is important; examiner
decisions should be consistent with the law and previous regulatory
pronouncements. However, it is not sufficient to ensure that examiner
decisions are consistent. While some appeals may involve MSDs that are
straightforward applications of law or written policy," other appeals
might present different issues.
Some appeals may involve questions of fact. For example, in rating a
loan, one factor considered is the value of the collateral securing the
loan."'t The financial institution and the regulator may have differing
conclusions about the value of that collateral. The examiner may have
properly classified the loan according to policy, but nevertheless arrived at
the wrong classification because the factual assessment of the value of the
collateral was incorrect. Standards of review that refer only to law and
policy are unhelpful in addressing such factual disputes.
A "consistent with agency policy"" 5 standard is also problematic when
existing law and written policy do not cover the issue raised by the
financial institution. For example, with respect to capital adequacy,
regulators have detailed regulations setting minimum levels, but regulators
often require additional capital.4 6 Exactly how regulators determine the
amount of additional capital is not included in any public pronouncement
and is rarely explained to financial institutions.44 7 Indeed, financial
institution regulators sometimes admit that some MSDs are not explicitly

442. See OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supra note 10; FRB Kansas City Appeals, supranote 163, at 6;
FRB Minneapolis Appeals, supra note 163, at 4; FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg.
17,055, 17,058 (Mar. 23, 2012).
443. Hattix Interview, supra note 13 ("Most of what we do, most of it is driven by the number or
policy that says, 'Here's how you treat certain situations."').
444. See, e.g., DIv. OF SUPERVISION & CONSUMER PROT., FDIC, RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF
EXAMINATION POLICIES § 3.2-41 (2012) ("Substandard loans are inadequately protected by the current

sound worth and paying capacity of the obligor or of the collateral pledged, if any.").
445. See OCC BULLETIN 2013 Ll5, supra note 10; FRB Kansas City Appeals, supra note 163, at
6; FRB Minneapolis Appeals, supra note 163, at 4; FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg.
17,055, 17,058 (Mar. 23, 2012).
446. See Hill, supra note 29, at 650-57, 698-99.
447. See id.
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governed by statute, regulation, or even public guidance."' It is when
examiners are exercising individual judgment that variations across
examiners are most likely to occur.
So what happens when a financial institution appeals an issue that
cannot be easily resolved by consulting governing law or written policies?
At present, regulators might review the MSD de novo," 9 review it for
"overall reasonableness," 5 0 review it under a standard adopted specifically
for that appeal, 4 5 1 or perhaps not even review it at all. There would be
value in simply unifying the standard across regulators so that each
appealing financial institution has the same opportunity for review.
Choosing the appropriate level of deference is more difficult. Because
judicial deference to administrative decisions is a bulwark of
administrative law, some may be tempted to graft similar levels of
deference onto the MSD appeals processes. A court reviewing an agency
administrative law judge's decision would review questions of fact under a
"substantial evidence" or "arbitrary and capricious standard."45 2 A court
reviewing questions of law or policy would apply Chevron,5 3 Skidmore,45 4

448. For example, in addressing a proposal to create an ombudsman outside of each of the
financial regulators to hear MSD appeals, see infra Part IV.D, David M. Marquis, then-NCUA
Executive Director explained:
Currently, much of an examiner's findings are based on sound judgment and sound business

or industry practice. . .. For example, there is no hard-and-true formula about proper asset
diversification. Today, if an examiner looks at a credit union's books and sees too many
mortgages with only a three percent down payment or inappropriately large mortgages, he or
she will warn of overconcentration in the exam report. If, however, a credit union appealed

this finding to an [authority outside the NCUA, the] NCUA could not point to the violation of
a specific regulation, other than citing the fact that overconcentration is an unsafe and
unsound practice.

Hearing on H.R. 3461, supra note 5, at 131-32 (written statement of David M. Marquis, Exec. Dir.,
NCUA).
449. FRB New York Appeals, supranote 163, at 10(a).
450. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,055, 17,058 (Mar. 23, 2012).
451. FRB Kansas City Appeals, supranote 163, at 6.
452. Agency factfinding established through formal proceeding made "on the record" are reversed
only if "unsupported by substantial evidence." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012). Agency factfinding
established through informal proceedings are reversed only if "arbitrary" or "capricious." Id.
§ 706(2)(A).
453. Chevron U.S.A., Inc v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
(holding that courts must "give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress," but gives
interpretations of ambiguous statutes "controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or

manifestly contrary to the statute").
454. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that when an agency is not
empowered to act with the force of law, the weight accorded to the agency's interpretation "will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade").
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or Auer. deference. However, many justifications for judicial deference
to agency determinations do not apply here.
First, courts defer to agencies because the Administrative Procedure
Act, or some other relevant statute, has instructed that they defer.4 56
Congress has determined that statutory gaps should be filled by
administrative agencies rather than courts.457 In contrast, Congress did not
specify a standard of review for MSD appeals in either the Administrative
Procedure Act458 or in the Riegle Community Development and
Regulatory Improvement Act. 4 59 Because both the MSD appeals process
and the initial examiners are housed within the administrative agency,
there is no reason to believe Congress preferred that the appellate authority
defer to the agency officials who reached the initial MSD.
Next, it is sometimes argued that judicial deference to agencies is
justified by the agencies' special expertise in the subject matter of the
controversy. 460 With MSDs, however, the appellate authorities have
expertise. Indeed, agency officials who hear MSD appeals generally have
greater training and experience than the examiners who made the initial
determination.46 1

455. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,
325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)) (holding that interprets a test that is "a creature of [its] own regulations, [its]
interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling unless 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation').
456. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983)
(explaining that when an agency was authorized to promulgate safety standards using informal
rulemaking, the Administrative Procedure Act's standard of review for informal rulemaking was

applicable).
457. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. See also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?:Implied
Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 736
(2002) ("[A] reviewing court lacks legitimacy if it attempts to displace an agency's reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statute with its own interpretation of the statute. After all, Congress

vested the agency, not the federal judiciary, with the authority to resolve the meaning of ambiguous
statutory text.").

458. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2012) (providing only that agencies provide "[p]rompt notice" and a
"brief statement" when denying a "request of an interested person made in connection with any agency

proceeding").
459. 12 U.S.C. § 4806 (2012).
460. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944). See also Krotoszynski, supra note 457, at 736 (noting that pre-Chevron case
law "squarely held that federal judges should afford persuasive force to the work product of agencies
based on the assumption that agencies possessed greater expertise over their own statutes and policies
than did federal courts").
461. The OCC's Ombusdman reports directly to the Comptroller. OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supra
note 10. Some Regional Federal Reserve Bank's policies specify that officer, manager, or senior staff
be appointed to review panels. See, e.g., FRB BOSTON APPEALS, supra note 163 (noting that the panel
may consist of "three officers/managers from other districts"); FRB PHILADELPHIA APPEALS, supra

note 163, § IV.B "senior" officials on review panels. In addition, Federal Reserve Bank appeals make
their way to the Regional Reserve Bank Presidents and then a member of the Board of Governors of
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Next, some note that judicial deference allows administrative agencies
to create a single uniform interpretation of the law. If each court exercised
its own judgment, different rules may apply in different jurisdictions.46 2
With the MSD appeals process, deference has the opposite effect. The
MSD process is an opportunity for a single appellate authority within each
regulator to harmonize differing examiner decisions.463 If the appellate
authority instead defers to the original examiner decision, we could end up
with many different but "reasonable" interpretations of banking law and
policy.
Judicial deference "has also been justified on democratic groundsnamely that agencies are politically accountable and courts are not."46
Again, this deference justification is not applicable because the MSD
appeals process is housed within each financial institution regulator, rather
than in a separate branch of government. The MSD appellate authority is
at least as accountable as the examination staff. Indeed, the appellate
authority is even more accountable due to the authorities' generally higher
position with each agency. Lower-level agency employees should not be
conclusively deciding questions of law and policy (including any
controversy about the appropriate application of law and policy). 4 65 Thus,

the Federal Reserve System. Federal Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,470,
16,472-73 (Mar. 30, 1995). At the FDIC, the Supervision Appeals Review Committee must contain
one FDIC inside board member and one deputy or special assistant to a board member. FDIC, Intra-

Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,055, 17,056. The NCUA's Supervisory Review Committee
consists of "members of the NCUA's senior staff." NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 1. In
contrast, a bank examiner might be an entry-level employee at the financial regulator. See Entry-Level

Bank Examiner, OCC (last visited Mar. 1, 2015) (describing the job of entry-level bank examiner).
462. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1105,

1121-22 (1987).
463. There is still the possibility that each regulator could come to a different conclusion, but
adding deference only compounds the potential differences.
464. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference to Agency Interpretations, 89

NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727, 743 (2013).
465. As Professor Mark Seidenfeld explains:
When an interpretation is made by a low-level official from a program, technical, or
enforcement office within an agency as part of his day-to-day functions, the interpretation is
likely to reflect the professional perspective of that official. It is unlikely either to go through
a serious vetting process within the agency, or be the focus of congressional or White House
attention. Thus, such an interpretation is more likely to reflect an idiosyncratic professional

perspective than is one that has been reached after consideration by agency officials with
different professional backgrounds or an interpretation that is sufficiently central to the

agency's mission that it will attract attention of those in the White House or on Capital [sic]
Hill.
Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron's Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 273, 301 (2011) (citations
omitted). Cf 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency
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the appellate authority deciding MSD appeals, should conduct de novo
review on questions of law or policy.
Finally, courts defer to agency findings of fact because the agency was
in a better position to collect and evaluate the facts underlying the
dispute.466 In the MSD appeals processes, the appellate authority has broad
access to the underlying facts.467 The OCC Ombudsman has even visited
financial institutions in order to resolve appeals. 4 6 8 Moreover, a de novo
standard of review of facts is not unprecedented for appeals within an
administrative agency. For example, if an applicant is denied a Social
Security claim, the applicant can request a hearing before an
administrative law judge who reviews the facts and law de novo in
reaching a decision. 46 9 The administrative law judge does not defer to the
agency officials who reached the initial eligibility determination. In MSD
appeals, the appellate authorities are in much the same position as the
administrative law judge. An initial agency decision has been made, often
by a relatively low-level agency official. The appeals or hearing process
offers the agency the opportunity to correct erroneous factual
determinations as well as errors of law.470
Thus, justifications for judicial deference fall short when applied to the
MSD appeals process. Moreover, if financial institutions view the MSD
appeals process as nothing more than a rubber stamp for the examiners,
few institutions will appeal.47 1 Consequently, the MSD appeals processes
should adopt a clear and robust standard of review.
Some may worry that de novo review, particularly when combined
with direct access to an independent appellate authority, will encourage
financial institutions to "sandbag" examination staff. Rather than raising
relevant facts or concerns with examiners, financial institutions might
remain silent and then overturn the MSD through the appeals process.

has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues
on notice or by rule.").
466. See, e.g., James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Generally
speaking, district courts reviewing agency action under the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard do
not resolve factual issues, but operate instead as appellate courts resolving legal questions.").
467. See supra notes 96, 173-74, 249, 317 and accompanying text.
468.

See supra note 96 and accompanying text.

469. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1429 (2014).
470. Colleagues have suggested that a robust appeals process might review question of law or
policy de novo but reviews questions of fact under an arbitrary and capricious standard. For the

reasons already explained, I believe the MSD appeal processes would function best with de novo
review of all appealable issues. However, I believe that a uniform arbitrary and capricious standard for
facts would be a significant improvement over the current system.
471. See supra note 392 and accompanying text (explaining that some credit unions report not

using the appeals process because they believe it will not make a difference).
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This, however, seems unlikely for a variety of reasons. First, the MSD
appeals process cannot be used to stall enforcement actions. Financial
institutions must comply with examiner instructions while any appeal is
pending.4 72 Second, financial institutions are repeat regulatory players. It is
not in their interest to antagonize regulators.473 Third, the historic success
rate for MSD appeals suggests it would be foolhardy for a financial
institution to think that winning on appeal is a foregone conclusion.4 74
Even if reforms strengthen the appeals process, financial institutions will
face risks when using the process.
Some may also worry a robust standard of review will add to the costs
of regulating financial institutions. Admittedly, it is difficult to predict
what it would cost for appellate authorities to conduct a robust review. It is
also difficult to predict to what extent the more robust review would lead
to increased use of the MSD appeals processes. Given past utilization of
the processes, I think it unlikely that additional costs would be
astronomical. To the extent that a more complete review does increase
regulatory costs, the cost may be justified by the improvement to the
regulatory system. Finally, any increased costs will not fall directly on
taxpayers. Financial regulators are funded by fees charged to financial
institutions475-institutions that are generally in favor of strengthening the
MSD appeals process.4 76
C. Public Disclosure ofAppeal Decisions
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, each appellate authority should
provide summary or redacted decisions. The information provided should
include (1) the reason the appealing financial institution believes the
examiner erred, (2) the applicable law, regulation, or agency guidance, and
(3) the decision and accompanying reasoning.
Regulators' primary objection to releasing decisions appears to be that
MSD
appeals
consider
confidential
information
from bank
examinations.477 Regulators keep examination information confidential,

472. See supra notes 168, 315 and accompanying text.
473. See Zenneth A. Ziskin, How to Cope with Tougher Exams and Enforcement Actions, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 28, 1992, at 4.
474. See supra Figures 3, 6, 10, 13.
475. CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 27, at 61-62; Connie Edwards Josey, Comment,
State v. National Banks: The Battle over Examination Fees, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 463, 466-68

(2002).
476.

See infra note 483 and accompanying text.

477.

Ulan Interview, supra note 13.
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believing that negative information could spark a bank run or even a
banking panic. 478
While secrecy may be warranted with respect to the examination
itself,47 9 there is no need to extend complete secrecy to MSD appeal
decisions. The OCC and FDIC have managed to strike a balance between
. .
.
480
releasing meaningful information and protecting sensitive .information.
Even during the 2008 financial crisis, disclosure of MSD appeals decisions
did not incite a bank run or banking panic. Cloaking the MSD appeals
processes in complete secrecy serves only to insulate the processes from
public accountability.
D. Another Proposal: The Super-Ombudsman
Others have advocated a more far-reaching change to the MSD appeals
processes. Over the last few years, members of Congress have repeatedly
introduced legislation that would create an appeals process outside of the
regulators to review MSDs. 48 ' The legislation would establish an
Ombudsman Office at the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council. This "super-Ombudsman"4 82 would investigate bank complaints
about regulators and hear appeals of MSDs. Financial institution trade
groups support such legislation.483 Yet so far, none of the legislative
proposals has made it out of committee.
Regulators oppose a super-Ombudsman. They argue that a new unified
arbiter could undercut regulators' ability to effectively monitor the safety

478. See generally Heidi Mandanis Schooner, The Secrets of Bank Regulation: A Reply to
ProfessorCohen, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 389 (2003).

479. Not everyone agrees on this point. See Heather Anderson, CAMEL Peace in Our Time,
CREDIT UNION TIMES, Feb. 11, 2013, at 1, 31 (describing disagreement between the North Carolina
credit union regulator and the NCUA over whether it was appropriate to publicly release CAMEL
ratings).
480. See supra notes 134-35, 266 and accompanying text. Some might argue that requiring the

&

appellate authority to provide a public, written opinion will delay the appeals processes. Again,
however, it appears that the OCC and FDIC have managed to provide decision information without
significant delays.
481. See; H.R. 2767, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 798, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 1553 113th Cong.
(2013); S. 727, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 2160, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R. 3461, 112th Cong. (2011).
482. See Hearingon HR. 3461, supra note 5, at 50 (statement of Eugene A. Ludwig, Founder
CEO, Promontory Financial Group, LLC).
483. Id. at 78 (written statement of Albert C. Kelly, Jr., Chairman, American Bankers
Association); id. at 150 (written statement of Ken Watts, President & CEO, West Virginia Credit
Union League).
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and soundness of the banking system. They assert that routing appeals
through a super-Ombudsman could:
*

delay corrective efforts and introduce additional risk in the
banking system;484

*

discourage financial institutions from properly
communicating with examiners; 485

*

result in decisions made by people who do not understand
the examination process unique to each regulator; 486

*

increase the cost of examinations by effectively requiring
"examiners ... to document each and every finding with
specific references to .. . rules and regulations;"48 7 and

*

increase regulatory costs by creating another government
bureaucracy.48 8

I am not necessarily opposed to an appeals process housed outside the
financial institution regulators. A single regulator could unify the differing
treatment faced by institutions with different regulators. Institutions may
also feel more comfortable bringing appeals to an appellate authority
outside their primary regulator. To the extent that a super-Ombudsman
would motivate regulators to more fully justify and explain examination
ratings and other MSDs in examination reports, it would be beneficial to
financial institutions and the examination process as a whole.

484. According to OCC Ombudsman Larry L. Hattix:
Our concern is that creating an outside bureaucracy to hear appeals will significantly delay
.

exam processing. [It would also] delay corrective actions that our supervisory process
determines are necessary for the safe and sound operation of that bank or savings association

...

If decisions are delayed because of an extended appeals period, bankers may be precluded

from conducting certain activities until the appeal is resolved and a final decision rendered.

Witkowski, supra note 121 (quoting Larry L. Hattix, Ombudsman, OCC).
485. Id. ("[T]he creation of an outside ombudsman may have a chilling effect on the everyday
communication that is critical to effective supervision.").

486. Lee Interview, supra note 13 ("If you had someone totally separate from the agency working
on [MSD appeals], I just feel like it would put credit unions kind of at a disadvantage if you had
somebody who was just completely unfamiliar with our processes and our institutions.").

487. Hearing on H.R. 3461, supra note 5, at 130 (written statement of David M. Marquis,
Executive Director, NCUA).

488. Id at 91 (Jennifer Kelly, Senior Deputy Comptroller for Midsize and Community Bank
Supervision, OCC); id at 133 (written statement of David M. Marquis, Executive Director, NCUA).
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However, creating a super-Ombudsman would require Congressional
action. This may be an uphill battle because regulators uniformly oppose
the proposals. And a super-Ombudsman potentially adds cost for both
regulators and financial institutions.489 Moreover, simply changing the
appellate body will not necessarily solve some of the major deficiencies in
the current system, namely the inconsistent rules regarding when the
appeals processes can be used, lack of a clear and rigorous standard of
review, and the lack of transparency. Rather than waiting to see if
Congress will impose a super-Ombudsman, regulators should take
initiative now to improve their MSD appeals processes.
CONCLUSION

When Congress mandated that each federal financial regulator provide
"an independent intra-agency appellate process . . . to review material
supervisory determinations made at insured depository institutions,'A 90it
hoped the processes would "provide an avenue of redress ... from uneven
treatment by examiners.'A91 Now, two decades later, the processes adopted
pursuant to this mandate have hardly been used. Regulators differ
significantly in the access they provide to the appeals process as well as
the standards they use to evaluate appeals. Even finding out basic
information about appeals decisions can be difficult. In short, the existing
MSD appeals processes do not provide a meaningful avenue for correcting
uneven regulatory treatment.
To achieve Congress's goal, regulators must strengthen their MSD
appeals processes. Financial institutions should have direct access to a
dedicated appellate authority outside of the examination function.
Regulators should allow appeals of a broad array of determinations,
including all CAMELS ratings and determinations underlying enforcement
actions entered with the consent of the financial institution. Regulators
should employ a clear and rigorous standard of review. Finally, regulators

489. A variant of the super-Ombudsman proposal by former Comptroller Eugene A. Ludwig
suggests that a super-Ombudsman taskforce comprised of representatives from each regulator be
grafted on top of existing regulatory MSD appeals processes. See id. at 50 (statement of Eugene A.
Ludwig, Founder & CEO, Promontory Financial Group, LLC). An institution could approach the
taskforce after exhausting the appeals process offered by its regulator. Id. Thus, the taskforce would
"play more of a coordinating role among the ombudsmen at the regulatory agencies, and act as a safety
valve or an appeals mechanism." Id. Given the small number of appeals that currently make it through

the existing MSD appeals processes, it seems doubtful that such a taskforce would be utilized enough
to justify the cost. This is particularly true if no changes are made to the existing appeals processes.
490. 12 U.S.C. § 4806(a) (2012).
491. S. REP. No. 103-169, at 51 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881, 1935.
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should release appeals decisions in summary or redacted form. While
regulators may initially be skeptical of my recommendations, more robust
appeals processes benefit regulators by lending credibility to the
regulatory structure.

